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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation advances a sociological view of the stock exchange market. I examine how 
multiple institutional logics – profession-based logic at the global level and corporate 
governance-based logic at the national level – influence analysts’ coverage and ratings for 
family-dominated firms in emerging markets. Specifically, I aim to address the following three 
questions: (1) how do multiple forms of logics affect a brokerage firm’s decision to cover 
family-dominated firms? (2) how do multiple logics influence analysts’ earnings forecasts and 
recommendations of family-dominated firms? and (3) how do several theoretically-relevant 
contingencies strengthen or weaken the influence of multiple institutional logics on analysts’ 
coverage and ratings? I examine these questions by conducting a longitudinal study of global 
analysts’ coverage and ratings of all publicly listed firms in South Korea and Taiwan during the 
period of 1996 to 2005.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The future value prospects of a firm are of great interest to everyone in financial markets. 
This is why the profession of securities analysts exists. They perform financial analyses for the 
firm under coverage, forecast its future earnings, and make recommendations to buy, sell, or hold 
its securities. In order to exercise good professional judgment in predicting the unknown future 
of firms, analysts draw upon a variety of information sources including publicly available 
documents and possible insider information. As their forecasts and recommendations have a 
significant impact on how the future of a firm is viewed in the stock exchange market, much 
attention from both investors and firms is being paid to their intermediary role. As shown in prior 
research, such intermediary role of securities analysts has been recognized as being of 
importance not only in a firm’s financial performance, such as firm valuation (Lang, Lins, & 
Miller, 2004; Stickel, 1985, 1992; Womack, 1996; Zuckerman, 1999), liquidity in stock returns 
(Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1995; Roulstone, 2003), and cost of equity capital (Gebhardt, Lee, 
& Swaminathan, 2001; Lang & Lundholm, 1996), but also in its strategic decisions, such as 
diversification strategy (Zuckerman, 2000), alliance announcements (Jensen, 2004), or CEO 
turnover (Puffer & Weintrop, 1991) and compensation (Wright, Kroll & Elenkov, 2002). 
Two theoretical lenses have been dominantly applied to the prior research of securities 
analysts. First, the functional approach of conceiving their professional knowledge and expertise 
as socially valuable and productive has prevailed in research on analysts, especially in the 
finance and accounting literatures (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Lang 
et al., 2004). A successful professionalization over a particular domain of knowledge depends on 
the extent that the public accepts the expertise claims made by the professionals and believes that 
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they serve the client’s best interests (Abbott, 1988). Here, the origin and proliferation of the 
analyst profession is basically rooted in the client’s belief that analysts are objective and 
independent experts who evaluate the future prospects of companies and help internal or external 
clients make a good investment decision. Under such functional conception of analysts, they are 
claimed not only as important market intermediaries that employ their knowledge-based 
expertise for the interests of their clients rather than their own, but also as a homogenous 
professional community that sees such intermediary function as appropriate (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). This professional service ideal, on the one hand, has been regarded as a cognitive and 
normative base of guiding members’ identities, values, and codes of ethics within the 
professional community. On the other hand, it has served as a cultural foundation of convincing 
the external public of their professional authority. The successful establishment of their 
professional authority has allowed the analyst profession to expand aggressively into foreign 
markets and become transnational over the past couple of decades (Chang, Khanna & Palepu, 
2001; Lang et al., 2004). 
More recently, an alternative perspective has highlighted conflicts of interest as a source 
of inconsistency among analysts’ evaluations, shifting attention from clients’ to their own 
interests and from professional expertise-based claims to political explanations. That their 
professional objectivity and independence can be distorted by political considerations was shown 
in terms of a variety of conflicts of interest, such as investment banking ties (Hayward & Boeker, 
1998; Hong & Kubick, 2002; Lin & McNichols, 1998; Michaely & Womack, 1999), investment 
interests of the clients of the bank (Sargent, 2000), reciprocal relationships with top executives in 
their client firms (Lim, 2001; Westphal & Clement, 2008), and the investment interests of the 
analysts themselves (Schack, 2001). These interest-centered arguments suggested that their 
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professional judgments are not just calculated with available economic information, but colored 
by a political situation where they are embedded. 
Although both the functional and the conflict models have advanced understanding of 
how analysts evaluate a firm, their main focus has been limited to the issue of whether their 
behaviors and cognitions are functionally profession-driven or dysfunctionally biased by 
conflicts of interest. However, given extreme uncertainty in producing future-oriented financial 
information about firms, their ways of perceiving problems to be solved and assessing solutions 
to these problems may be influenced not only by the pursuit of their professional ideals or self-
interests, but also by collective sense-making of what constitutes a good firm for investment. 
Little research, however, has focused on how analysts’ evaluative frameworks are socially 
constructed (for an exception, see Zuckerman 1999). This dissertation aims to develop an 
alternative way of understanding analysts’ evaluations – the institutional logic approach. 
The central argument of the institutional logic approach is that individuals and 
organizations are located in an interrelated system of multiple institutional sectors, such as 
market, corporation, profession, state, family, and religion, each of which provides its distinct set 
of assumptions, beliefs, norms, and rules over what is appropriate (Friedland & Alford, 1991; 
Thornton, 2004). Accordingly, the approach of conceptualizing institutional environments as 
plural and fragmented, rather than dominated by a singular logic, has been proposed as a better 
way of capturing the link between social institutions and organizational behaviors (Greenwood, 
Diaz, Li, & Lorente, 2009; Lounsbury, 2007). Such simultaneous embeddedness of organizations 
in multiple institutional logics suggests that not all actors within an institutional field, industry, 
or profession are under the same influence of a given logic because different actors may 
differentially draw upon available logics (Greenwood et al., 2009; Lok, forthcoming; Marquis & 
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Lounsbury, 2007). 
Despite the notion that multiple institutional logics simultaneously constitute realities and 
meanings of an actor’s social world (Friedland & Alford,1991), most existing studies on logics 
have assumed that an actor draws on a dominant logic in a given time and location when 
organizing its material life and giving meaning to its social reality. Prior research, for example, 
has focused on either the existence of different logics in different communities (Lounsbury, 
2007; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007) or temporal change of dominant logics in various 
professional domains, such as nouvelle cuisine (Rao, Monin & Durand, 2003), publishing 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), architecture (Thornton, Jones & Kury, 2005), and medicine (Reay & 
Hinings, 2005; Scott, Ruef, Mendel & Caronna, 2000). While it is recognized that dominant 
institutional logics vary across different times or spatial locations in an industry or a  profession, 
it is presumed that the impact of a prevailing logic is internally consistent and homogenous in a 
given time and location. However, to the extent that institutional sectors interact with each other, 
multiple logics could be simultaneously running within one institutional sector, although their 
relative influence on how an actor perceives the world may vary. This issue speaks to the need 
for questioning the consistent influence of the dominant logic within one institutional sector by 
locating individuals and organizations in “a potentially contradictory inter-institutional system” 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991: 240). In this dissertation, I examine the coexistence of multiple 
logics within an institutional sector – namely, analyst profession – and how such logics affect 
professional service firms’ decision-making and individual professionals’ judgments. 
By conducting a longitudinal study of global investment analysts’ activities in emerging 
markets during the period 1996-2005, this dissertation examines how coexisting multiple logics 
– profession-based and corporate governance-based logics – influence analysts’ coverage, 
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earnings forecasting, and stock recommendations for family-dominated firms. The central logic 
of the analyst profession, on the one hand, is based on the functional conception of analysts as 
professionals who independently and objectively exercise their financial expertise for the client’s 
best interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Under this profession-based logic, analysts are viewed 
as members of a homogeneous professional community with a common set of values, norms and 
beliefs as to what constitutes good corporate governance. The diversity of national corporate 
governance models, on the other hand, suggests that, depending on the governance logic 
dominant in countries where brokerage firms are embedded, analysts may be under different 
normative belief structures and cognitive frameworks regarding what constitutes good corporate 
governance. Cross-national literature on corporate governance has focused on the prominent role 
of shared belief systems regarding appropriate governance models, which are produced by a 
broad set of complementary institutions including the state, the financial infrastructure, inter-firm 
network, union organizations, and business systems (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Ahmadjian & 
Robbins, 2005; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Guillen, 2001; Hall & Soskice, 2001). Extensive evidence 
has shown the influence of distinct corporate governance models as institutional logics on 
various governance forms and practices, including stock-based executive compensation 
programs (Fiss & Zajac, 2004), hostile takeover (Schneper & Guillen, 2004), foreign direct 
investment (Luo, Chung & Sobczak, 2008), downsizing (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005), and 
business group restructuring (Chung & Luo, 2008). Such different cognitive orientations 
regarding appropriate corporate governance suggest that not all analysts may have the same view 
or interpretation of appropriate corporate governance. This heterogeneity may be a critical issue 
especially when there is a strong institutionally-loaded signal like family-dominated firms, 
because such a signal may lead analysts to invoke different assumptions, values, and beliefs in 
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evaluating a firm. 
Analysts’ research on family-dominated firms has been increasingly of interest to 
scholars for the two main reasons: family-dominated firms’ worldwide ubiquity and their agency 
problems. First, as a result of the rapid globalization of financial markets, family-dominated 
firms have increasingly become a focal point of analyst research because they are prevalent 
through the world (Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). According to a recent study of analyst 
coverage in a non-U.S. context, for example, a sample of more than 2,500 firms from 27 
countries, of which the largest shareholder is mostly a family, are followed on average by 6 
analysts (Lang et al., 2004). Second, family-dominated firms are difficult to monitor due to the 
lack of information transparency (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Since analysts are 
expected to play a large role in reducing potential agency problems that arise between corporate 
insiders and outside shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), their professional service over 
family-dominated firms is of considerable importance to investors and other participants in 
financial markets. 
Specifically, I attempt to address the following three questions in this dissertation. The 
first question is “how do multiple logics affect analyst coverage of a family-dominated firm?” 
Brokerage houses’ decision of which company to follow, which I refer to as analyst coverage, is 
a critical step to trigger subsequent professional activities, such as earnings forecasts and 
recommendations. Scholars in the finance and accounting literatures have been concerned with 
whether analysts respond favorably to increased demands for monitoring family-dominated firms 
with potentially high agency problems or avoid covering those firms due to great difficulties of 
obtaining information (Boubaker & Labegorre, 2008, Chang et al., 2001; Lang et al., 2004). 
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Despite their opposite predictions of analysts’ following family-dominated firms, what these 
competing arguments have in common is that they are members of a homogenous community 
that shares the professional service ideal, that is, objective and independent evaluators of firms. 
Given that actors “do what they see as appropriate for themselves in a specific type of situation” 
(March & Olsen, 2004: 3), however, the multiplicity of institutional logics may provide multiple 
forms of rationality to guide analysts in setting an appropriate model of which firms to follow. 
Particularly, since different countries are embedded in different normative belief structures and 
cognitive frameworks regarding what is deemed as appropriate corporate governance 
(Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Guillen, 2001; Hall & Soskice, 2001), home-
country governance models that brokerage houses are based on may be deeply imprinted in 
defining which firm is appropriate to follow and directing their attention to those firms. By 
examining the influence of multiple institutional logics on brokerage houses’ choices of which 
company to follow, I attempt to answer why and how a particular logic is more or less influential 
over others in shaping an organization’s decision making and extend our understanding of the 
linkage between institutional logics and organizational behavior. 
The second question that I examine is “how do multiple logics affect individual analysts’ 
forecasts and recommendations of family-dominated firms?” One of the key assumptions in the 
institutional logic approach is that logics define an individual’s cognitive orientations regarding 
the order of the world. Individuals embedded in different cognitive structures of values, beliefs, 
and assumptions are conceived to see what constitutes appropriateness in a distinct way (March 
& Olsen, 2004) and allocate their attention in a differentiated fashion (Ocasio, 1997). While most 
existing studies acknowledged the central role of actors’ cognitive orientations in understanding 
the mechanisms by which institutional logics influence their behaviors, the cognitive process 
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itself has rarely been directly examined. Rather, the research literature has tended to focus on 
logic-driven behaviors through examining similarities and variations in adopting organizational 
forms or practices (Lounsbury, 2007; Shipilov, Greve & Rowley, forthcoming; Thornton & 
Ocasio, 1999). As a result, much less is known about the micro-foundations of institutional 
logics – how institutional logics influence individuals’ cognitive processes (Thornton & Ocasio, 
2008). I attempt to address this gap by examining whether or not analysts from different 
governance models evaluate family-dominated firms in different but systematic ways. While 
prior research in the finance and accounting literatures (Chan, Karceski & Lakonishok, 2007; 
Cowen, Groysberg, & Healy, 2006; Dugar & Nathan, 1995; Klein, 1990; Michaely & Womack, 
1999) as well as organization theory (Hayward & Boeker, 1998; Westphal & Clement, 2008) 
emphasized conflicts of interest as a source of heterogeneous judgments across analysts, this 
study proposes that analysts’ evaluative frameworks may be influenced by the home-country 
governance models of their professional organizations, indicating that institutional logics 
introduce prescriptive dimensions into professional evaluations. 
Finally, I also go beyond the basic arguments described above by asking “how do several 
theoretically-relevant contingencies strengthen or weaken the influence of multiple institutional 
logics on analysts’ coverage and ratings?” Even if they appear to accept a set of logics, not all 
actors in a field are under the same influence of those logics (Greenwood et al., 2009; Lok, 
forthcoming; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). Specifically, given that an analyst is an intermediary 
between seller-side (firms) and buyer-side (investment environments) (Zuckerman, 1999), I 
propose that logics’ applicability to analysts’ coverage and ratings depends upon three different 
contingencies: (1) from the intermediary side, reputation of both individual analysts and their 
brokerage houses; (2) from the seller side, legitimacy signaling through independent 
9 
 
directorships and CEOs’ educational backgrounds; and (3) from the buyer side, business group 
structure at the national level. These investigations are expected to show specific circumstances 
where individuals and organizations are either independent of or constrained by prevailing 
institutional logics and shed light on interactive processes between institutional logics and 
organizations or individuals. 
I examine these three questions by looking at global analysts’ activities of all publicly 
listed firms in South Korea and Taiwan during the period of 1996 to 2005. My choice of these 
two countries presents three advantages for this study. First, the financial markets in Korea and 
Taiwan may be the important meeting grounds where distinct governance logics come together 
because of their rapid liberalization of the foreign exchange market and increasing deregulation 
of capital flows. Given that a majority of publicly listed firms are family-dominated in these two 
countries (Claessens et al., 2000), this empirical context is suitable for the purposes of the study 
because different brokerage houses may bring in distinct views of the family governance model 
from their home institutional environments to local Korean and Taiwanese markets. Second, as 
typical in many emerging markets, both countries are characterized by investor environments 
with weak protection for minority shareholders because of their weak legal protection, highly 
concentrated ownership structure, and cross-holdings through pyramiding (Claessens et al., 
2000; La Porta et al., 1999; Morck, Strangeland & Yeung, 1998). These characteristics 
associated with high potentiality of severe agency problems highlight the importance of 
examining the critical role played by analysts in the functioning of capital markets. Finally, 
based on similarities between these two countries in investor environments and financial systems, 
I anticipate finding similar results in both countries regarding the propositions described above, 
which can provide strong confirmations for the validity of my arguments in emerging markets. 
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CHAPTER 1: TWO LOGICS IN THE GLOBAL ANALYST PROFESSION 
 
 In this dissertation, I examine how the logics rooted in two different institutional sectors 
– the profession and the corporation – influence analysts’ coverage and ratings for family-
dominated firms in emerging markets. Profession-based and corporate governance-based logics 
operate under different underlying assumptions about how analysts evaluate a firm in the global 
market. Whereas, under the profession-based logic, analysts are considered to be members of a 
homogenous professional community that should have a common evaluative framework 
regarding appropriate corporate governance model, the corporate governance-based logic 
suggests that analysts from different countries may be rooted in a different set of shared 
understandings regarding what constitutes appropriate governance forms and practices.  
 
Global Professional Logic  
Profession is generally referred to as an occupation that successfully claims exclusive 
jurisdiction over a particular domain of knowledge (Abbott, 1988). Like other major institutional 
sectors of contemporary societies, such as the market, the corporation, the family, the religions, 
and the state, the profession has its central logic which provides distinct symbolic systems and 
material practices (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2004). Thornton (2004: 42), for instance, 
elaborated how profession-based legitimacy, authority, norms, and organizing principles can be 
different from those based on other institutional sectors. Similarly, Freidson (2001) referred to 
professionalism as the third logic that operates under a different set of assumptions from the 
other two logics, market and organizations.  
The basis of the central logic in the analyst profession is on the belief that analysts are 
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objective and independent in evaluating the future prospects of firms’ financial values. Such 
centrality of analysts’ objectivity and independence is evidently accentuated by the CFA Institute, 
the professional association sponsoring the Chartered Financial Analyst certification that most 
analysts earn to enhance their professional standing. The CFA Institute, for example, articulates 
in its vision that the analyst profession should be based on the belief that “the interests of the 
ultimate investor must take precedence over those of other market participants” (CFA Institute, 
2009), which requires analysts to evaluate firms in an objective and independent way. Likewise, 
its code of professional ethics starts with the statement that “the profession of securities analysis 
and investment management has evolved because of the increasing public need for competent, 
objective, and trustworthy advice with regard to investments and financial management” (AIMR, 
1992: 1).  
Such professional missions and standards of ethics not only reinforce analysts to be 
indoctrinated to look at themselves as a monitoring device in achieving free, fair, and efficient 
capital markets, but convince the client of the legitimacy of their professional authority. For 
example, the client’s anticipations for analysts’ objectivity and independence are well 
represented in Institutional Investor magazine’s “What Investors Really Want” annual survey 
where institutional investors, such as banks, insurance companies, and pension or mutual funds, 
rank necessary attributes of an equity research analyst in order of importance. As the survey’s 
results show in Table 1, the exercise of objective and independent professional judgment free 
from the influence or control of others has been expected as one of the most important attributes 
to analysts along with other attributes associated to the technical job requirements. More 
interestingly, institutional investors rated professional integrity, independence, or avoidance of 
interest conflicts as more important attributes of analysts than the basic professional services that 
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they provide, such as stock selections or earnings estimates. 
The role of analysts as an independent and objective intermediary between the market 
and firms has been also illuminated by scholars in the finance and accounting literatures. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), for example, suggested that the profession of securities analysts is socially 
valuable and productive because it could be a critical monitoring device to reduce the agency 
costs associated with the ownership structure of firms. Empirically, the positive impact of analyst 
coverage has been shown in the United States or international contexts, in terms of higher firm 
valuation (Lang et al., 2004), liquidity in stock returns (Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1995; 
Roulstone, 2003), and lower cost of equity capital (Gebhardt et al., 2001). Furthermore, there is 
substantial evidence that analysts’ stock recommendations influence investor trading behavior 
and stock market valuations (Ho, 1995; Womack, 1996). Both practical and academic supports 
for analysts’ professionalism have contributed to establishing taken-for granted legitimacy for 
their professional authority in global financial markets.  
Under the profession-based logic, analysts are conceived as members of a homogeneous 
community to see the above professional service ideal as appropriate. This view reflects the 
tendency that prior research studies on analysts focused on either seller-side (firms) or buyer-side 
(investment environments) factors when examining what influences analysts’ activities, rather 
than on the intermediary itself – analysts and their brokerage houses. In the finance and 
accounting literatures, for example, analyst coverage has been examined in terms of either firm-
specific factors, such as a firm’s size, performance, ownership structure, and disclosure practices 
(Bhushan, 1989; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; McNichols & O’Brien, 1997; Moyer, Chatfield, & 
Sisneros, 1989; O’Brien & Bhushan, 1990), or country-specific factors, such as a country’s legal 
system, quality of accounting disclosures, and investor protection level (Bushman, Piotroski & 
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Smith, 2005; Chang et al., 2001; Haw, Hu, Hwang & Wu, 2004; Lang et al., 2004). Similarly, 
some organization scholars like Zuckerman (1999, 2000) viewed the analyst profession as a 
homogeneous community under the influence of the taken-for-granted practice – industry-based 
specialization, and showed how companies failing to confirm to such profession-wide practice 
were subjected to the cost of illegitimacy in the stock market.  
This conceptualization of the analyst profession as a homogeneous community is 
consistent with prior studies on institutional logics, which have focused on the impact of shifts 
from one logic to another on organizational behaviors in a variety of professional domains. 
Thornton and Ocasio (1999) and Thornton (2001, 2002) examined how executive succession, 
merger and acquisition, and   structural change to multidivisional form in the U.S. higher 
education publishing profession were influenced by changes from an editorial logic to a market 
logic. Scott et al. (2000) studied how changes in logics from professional dominance to managed 
care influenced governance mechanisms in health care organizations. Lounsbury (2002) showed 
how the institutional transformation from a regulatory logic to market logic shaped the 
professionalization of the finance occupations. Rao et al. (2003) depicted the changes in chefs’ 
role identities triggered by replacements of the dominant professional logic in the French 
culinary world. Thornton, Jones, and Kury (2005) described the impact of institutional 
transformations on organizational change as the accounting profession shifted from a fiduciary 
logic to a corporate logic, as the architecture profession shifted from an aesthetic logic to an 
efficiency logic, and as the publishing profession shifted from an editorial logic to a market logic. 
A couple of features are commonly shared among these research studies. First, they focused on 
the fundamental change in central logics that most professions have undergone, which is 
institutional transformation from the traditional professionalism based on professional autonomy 
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and peer-oriented control mechanisms, into the market-oriented logic with focus on lower costs 
and higher returns. Second, they are commonly based on the assumption that individuals and 
organizations within a profession are uniformly under such historical contingency.  
 
National Corporate Governance Logic 
Over the past two decades, cross-national variations of corporate governance models 
have been explained in terms of country-specific legal systems of either common or civil law 
(Claessens et al., 2002; Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), 
political interactions of interest group preferences (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Gourevitch & 
Shinn, 2005; Schneper & Guillen, 2004), and the role of shared belief systems regarding 
appropriate governance models (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Hall & 
Soskice, 2001; Luo et al., 2008). Although scholars from different disciplines place different 
emphases in explaining cross-country variations in who controls corporations and how that 
control is exercised, they reach agreement on one critical issue; Berle and Means’s (1932) classic 
model of widely dispersed corporate ownership is not common around the world. Even though 
atomistic shareholder structures are dominant in the US and the UK, different types of 
blockholders, such as family, financial institutions, or government, control a substantial number 
of corporations in both most developed and emerging economies.  
Since different countries view public corporations on a basis of different normative belief 
structures and cognitive frameworks (Jepperson & Meyer, 1991; Fiss & Zajac, 2004), variations 
in governance forms and practices within and between countries could be better understood 
when prevailing logics of corporate governance are taken into account. Cross-national corporate 
governance literature has provided extensive evidence that the prevalence of certain governance 
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forms or practices in a country depends on the prevailing logic of what constitutes appropriate 
corporate governance (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Gourevitch & Shinn, 
2005; Schneper & Guillen, 2004; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). Moreover, a recent rising interest in 
the contexts in which contested governance models came into direct contact has led to a growing 
recognition of the interactive influence between divergent governance models on strategic 
decisions and governance mechanisms, such as foreign direct investment (Luo et al., 2008), asset 
divestiture (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005), stock-based executive compensation programs (Fiss 
& Zajac, 2004), and business group restructuring (Chung & Luo, 2008). As the globalization of 
financial markets has driven foreign investors to bring distinct logics of corporate governance 
models from their home to local countries, social interactions and conflicts between 
heterogeneous governance models have increasingly taken place across national borders 
(Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Luo et al., 2008). For instance, describing the 
increase in foreign portfolio investment in Japan as the clash between two different governance 
models, Ahmadjian and Robbins (2005) observed the influence of foreign investors with a 
distinct logic of shareholder value maximization on corporate restructuring behaviors of local 
Japanese firms embedded in the stakeholder system. Particularly, their finding that the influence 
of foreign investors depended upon how deeply Japanese firms were embedded in the local 
business system implies that local firms operate under strong pressures by existing belief 
structure regarding appropriate governance practices. In a similar vein, Luo et al. (2008) found 
that, depending on their home country governance models, US and Japanese firms showed 
different preferences in choosing local joint venture partners in Taiwan. Such important role of 
national corporate governance models as institutional logics in shaping actors’ cognition and 
behavior suggests that brokerage houses from different countries and their analysts may be 
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rooted in a different set of shared understanding regarding the appropriate governance model. In 
this aspect, unlike the profession-based logic that views global analysts as members of a 
homogeneous professional community with a common schema for evaluating firms, the diversity 
of corporate governance systems across countries indicates that not all analysts may have the 
same evaluative frameworks.  
The approach of conceiving the analyst profession as consisting of more heterogeneous 
groups with a different set of shared cognitive and normative frameworks is consistent with 
recent theoretical developments of the idea that geographic differences is one of primacy sources 
of variations in prevailing logics. Whether such differences are rooted in cities (Lounsbury, 
2007; Marquis, 2003; Marquis, Glynn & Davis, 2007), regions (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; 
Saxenian, 1996), or countries (Luo, 2007), this stream of research has placed emphasis on the 
significant influence of prevailing logics on corporate behavior and strategy at local or national 
community. Lounsbury (2007), for example, showed how competing institutional logics, 
fundamentally rooted in geographic differences between Boston and New York, led to practice 
variation in mutual funds industry. Likewise, Luo (2007), in a study of cross-national differences 
on training attitudes, described how national institutional logics concerning the individual’s role 
had influenced people’s preferences for the continuous learning model of employee training.  
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CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH SETTING AND HYPOTHESES  
 
Global Analysts in South Korea and Taiwan 
Both Korea and Taiwan followed the German law tradition featured by the weaker 
investor protections and the less developed capital markets, as compared to English (common) 
law countries like the US and the UK (La Porta et al., 1999). As typical in many emerging 
economies, investment environments of both countries are characterized by high potentiality of 
information asymmetries between insiders in a firm and outside investors, mainly due to family-
dominated ownership structure, cross-holdings through pyramiding, and less reliable accounting 
disclosures by companies (Claessens et al., 2002; Khanna & Palelpu, 1997, 1999; La Porta et al., 
1999; Morck et al., 1998). Since the mid-1990s, there has been increasing liberalization of the 
foreign exchange market and gradual deregulation of the domestic financial sector in these two 
countries. The stock markets in Korea and Taiwan were opened to foreign investors in 1992 and 
1991 respectively, subject to the restriction that foreign investors could own up to 10% of listed 
firms (International Finance Corporation, 2000). These limits were subsequently raised several 
times in a few years, which led foreign investors to become one of the major players in their 
domestic stock markets. In Korea, for example, foreign investors’ ownership rose from 13% to 
40% and their stock trading value from 6% to 21% between 1996 and 2005 
(http://eng.krx.co.kr/index.html). The similar patterns held for the Taiwanese stock market.  
This rapid globalization of the domestic stock markets in Korea and Taiwan has 
dramatically stimulated demands for global analysts’ research service. Foreign investors, who 
were not acquainted with local systems, needed more expert investigations of investment 
prospects of local firms. In particular, the family-based governance model in these countries 
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presented significant monitoring challenges of local Korean and Taiwanese companies to foreign 
investors because of the lack of information transparency. Accordingly, analysts from global 
brokerage houses were expected to play an important role as information intermediaries in 
protecting minority shareholders and promoting the functioning of capital markets in these 
emerging markets. Table 2 shows how global analysts from different countries were actively 
involved in evaluating and monitoring local Korean and Taiwanese firms during the study period. 
In 2005, 41 and 30 brokerage houses from 10 countries covered Korean and Taiwanese firms 
respectively. The proportion of publicly listed firms covered by analysts, although it varied from 
year to year, was substantial in the stock markets of these two emerging countries throughout the 
study period. Furthermore, the average number of analysts per firm followed had gradually 
increased over time, indicating the continued growth of analyst research market in both countries. 
These trends in Table 2 confirm that the globalization of the security analyst profession is the 
case in both Korea and Taiwan, as commonly seen in most developed and emerging economies.  
Financial market openings to foreign investors have also led to a rapid growth of local 
analysts in Korea and Taiwan. As Table 3 shows, while there were few local brokerage houses 
until the late 1990s in these two countries, they quickly became one of the dominant leaders in 
this professional market after 1999. A local newspaper article (Dong-A Daily News, 2001) 
described the poor status of early local analysts in Korea as following: “It was until after the mid 
or late 1990s that little attention had been devoted to research centers in local brokerage houses. 
Research centers used to be treated as a place for stockbrokers who were relegated to a trivial job 
for a limited time because of their sales failure.” This situation changed abruptly after the late 
1990s. Table 3 indicates that there has been a dramatic increase in local brokerage houses and 
their activities, particularly in Korea, during the study period. In 2005, analysts from 18 local 
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brokerage houses provided research service for 40% of a total of 679 publicly traded firms in 
Korea and those from 5 local houses did so for 22% of a total of 686 firms in Taiwan.  
  
Hypotheses  
In this dissertation, the impact of multiple institutional logics on global analysts’ 
activities in emerging markets is examined in the following three areas: (1) the link between 
institutional logics and a critical component of organizational decision-making in brokerage 
houses – their choice of which firms to cover; (2) the link between institutional logics and 
individual analysts’ ratings – their forecasts for earnings and recommendations, and (3) 
theoretically-relevant contingencies that may strengthen or weaken the influence of institutional 
logics over analyst coverage and ratings. These issues are addressed in the context of global 
analysts’ activities for family-dominated firms in emerging markets. 
 
Analyst Coverage of Family-dominated Firms  
Analyst coverage is of great concern not only to investors but to firms. First of all, given 
that analyst reports are a primary source of information to investors, analyst coverage is a key 
factor in determining the availability of information to investors. As more analysts follow a firm, 
investors are likely to have more information of that firm with less effort. Empirical evidence 
provided that the number of analysts who follow a firm plays a critical role in attracting 
investors’ attention to that firm as well as improving the functioning of capital markets. The 
positive impact of increased analyst coverage, for example, has been shown to reduce investors’ 
estimation risk (Barry & Brown, 1985; Lang & Lundholm, 1996) and a firm’s cost of equity 
capital (Gebhardt, et al., 2001), increase a firm’s trading volume (Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 
20 
 
1995; Brennan & Tamarowski, 2005) and valuation (Brennan & Tamarowski, 2005; Lang et al., 
2004), and help investors add neglected but valuable stocks in their portfolio (Merton, 1987). 
Consequently, the importance of analysts as surrogate investors leads corporate IR (investor 
relations) activities to focus on analysts as their principal target (Brennan & Tamarowski, 2005; 
Rao & Sivakumar, 1999; Zuckerman, 1999, 2000). As the attention of the financial community 
depends upon the number of analysts who follow a firm, its executives are prompted to engage in 
developing and maintaining favorable relationships with analysts through critical information 
sharing, frequent meetings, and personal favors (Westphal & Clement, 2008). Marcus (2005: 
125) describes the importance of analysts in the IR context as following, “It would be unrealistic 
to suggest that investor relations practitioners can unduly influence a stock recommendation if 
there is no appropriate underlying economic value in that stock. But it’s just as unrealistic to 
expect an analyst or investor to know and understand all of the factors that affect the underlying 
values in each stock in the market.”   
Profession-based Logic. Under the profession-based logic, high potentiality of agency 
problems in family-dominated firms paradoxically leads to two contradictory propositions 
regarding the link between analyst coverage and family governance (Boubaker & Labegorre, 
2008; Chang et al., 2001; Lang et al., 2004). Whereas the efficacy of analyst profession as a 
monitoring device in global financial markets is commonly assumed between these opposite 
arguments, each focuses on the increase in either demand or cost for analyst coverage. While 
analysts may respond favorably to the client’s increased demands for reducing potentially high 
agency problems of family-dominated firms, they may be reluctant to cover these firms because 
of high costs in achieving and maintaining good professional judgment. 
The claim that analysts serve investors’ interests by monitoring potential agency 
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problems is central to the legitimacy of the analyst profession. This rationale is based on Jensen 
and Meckling’s (1976: 355) argument that “to the extent that security analysis activities reduce 
the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control, they are indeed 
socially productive.” As a result, the potentiality of high agency problems driven by the 
discrepancy between ownership and control would lead to more demands for outside monitoring 
by analysts because investors would need more independent and objective information through 
the eyes of beholders for firms with those problems. Moyer et al. (1989), for instance, showed 
that analyst coverage is negatively related to insider (executives and directors) stock ownership 
for a sample of S&P 500 firms in the United States, supporting Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
claim that better incentive alignments between managers and investors would lead to less 
necessity for outside monitoring. Similarly, with a sample of French listed firms, Boubaker and 
Labegorre (2008) found that analysts provided more coverage for firms with high discrepancy 
level between ownership and control as well as those controlled through pyramiding, responding 
favorably to investors’ increased demands of their services. Given that family-dominated firms 
are closely associated with poor information disclosure, potentiality of insider exploitation, and 
weak investor protection (Claessens et al., 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Morck & Yeung, 
2004), they could be where independent and objective inspections by analysts are mostly 
requested in the financial market. Thus, I propose the following:  
 
Hypothesis 1a: The greater a firm’s family-dominance, the more brokerage firms follow it, 
regardless of their country origins. 
 
However, despite the normative claim that analysts respond favorably to increased 
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demands of their professional services for family-dominated firms, they may be less likely to do 
so because coverage of family-dominated firms may increase the risk of their professional 
reputation damage resulting from false estimations. In order to achieve and maintain good 
professional judgment about firms’ investment prospects, securities analysts  draw upon a wide 
variety of information including publicly available documents and possible insider information 
(Lees, 1981). At the macro level, they analyze economic and industry trends, new regulations or 
policies, and national politics to forecast the impact of current and future trends in investment 
environments on a specific firm. At the micro level, they examine public financial disclosure 
reports produced by companies and often conduct face-to-face or telephone interviews with 
executives to gain insider information in timely and reliable ways. Particularly, given that much 
of the information that analysts draw on in their evaluations is provided directly by the firm 
(Lees, 1981; Westphal & Clement, 2008), the timely accessibility and high validity of such 
information is critical for analysts to reduce their estimation risk (Healy, Hutton & Palepu, 1999; 
Lang & Lundholm, 1996). The failure of obtaining timely and relevant information from the firm 
about recent industry trends, corporate finances, and strategic decisions could hurt the objectivity 
in their evaluations and increase the risk of reputation damage.  
As the availability of information is a key determinant of enabling analysts to serve the 
client’s best interests by providing accurate predictions of firms’ future prospects, it seems 
obvious that analysts are reluctant to follow firms with poor information disclosures (Bushman et 
al., 2005; Chang et al., 2001; Healy et al., 1999; Lang et al., 2004; Lang & Lundholm, 1996). In 
fact, there is substantial evidence that analysts are more likely to follow firms with easily 
accessible and more reliable information. Finding strong consensus among analysts’ earnings 
forecasts for firms with more informative disclosure practices, Lang and Lundholm (1996: 468) 
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suggested that “different analysts make different forecasts primarily because of differences in 
non-firm-provided information, rather than differences in interpretation of common 
information.” Using data for 100 countries for the years 1987-2000, Bushman et al. (2005) found 
that analyst coverage increased after the adoption and enactment of laws restricting insider 
trading. Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Healy et al. (1999) showed analysts’ reluctance to 
investigate poor information environments, documenting that firms with more informative 
disclosure policies are accompanied by increase in analyst coverage. Further, Lang et al. (2004) 
and Bushman et al. (2005) found that such negative association of analyst coverage with the poor 
quality of corporate disclosures was even stronger in countries with weak investor protection.  
Accordingly, given that family-dominated firms tend to avoid the communication of 
material information in a timely fashion and hide or manipulate valuable information for their 
ends (Claessens et al., 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Morck & Yeung, 2004), coverage of such 
family-dominated firms is likely to impose high risk of false predictions to analysts. Thus, I 
propose that analysts are more likely to avoid covering family-dominated firms.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: The greater a firm’s family-dominance, the less brokerage firms follow it, 
regardless of their country origins. 
 
National Corporate Governance Logic. The diversity of national corporate governance 
models suggests that organizations from different countries are embedded in a different set of 
normative belief structures and cognitive frameworks about appropriate corporate governance. 
Recent research in corporate governance has suggested that evaluation of corporate practices is 
not simply driven by their inherent efficiency, but is also socially constructed by prevailing 
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institutional logics (Dobbin & Baum, 2000; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). For 
example, the prevailing belief that companies belong to stakeholders rather than shareholders led 
German firms to resist against the increasing pressures of adopting the Anglo-American 
shareholder value orientation by engaging in decoupling mechanisms (Fiss & Zajac, 2004). In a 
similar vein, as companies in Japan are expected to operate in the interest of all stakeholders, not 
just of shareholders, downsizing and asset divestures, usually seen as being in the best interests 
of shareholders in the US and the UK, were perceived against their cherished model of 
stakeholder capitalism (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005). Luo et al.’s (2008) finding that different 
preferences between US and Japanese firms in choosing local Taiwanese joint venture partners 
are based on their home country governance models sheds light on the potential problem of 
treating foreign firms from different home countries as a homogeneous category of foreign 
investors.  
Unlike the professional logic that views the analyst profession as a homogeneous 
community with similar evaluative systems on analyzing a firm’s ownership structure and 
governance practices, cross-national variations in governance models propose that brokerage 
houses’ choices of which firms to cover may be systematically different, depending on their 
home-based governance models. Particularly, in that different national corporate governance 
systems provide contesting logics concerning the appropriateness of concentrated family 
ownership and control, family-dominated firms present an interesting case to the study of 
heterogeneous decision-making among brokerage firms. The brokerage houses from the US or 
the UK, for example, may have negative preferences for governance practices prevalent in 
family-dominated firms, such as ownership concentration, cross-shareholding across firms, 
insider trading, excessive control by family owners, and unification of management and 
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ownership control. As they are constituted by the shareholder-based governance model, they may 
view family-dominated firms as not in investors’ interests due to high potentiality of severe 
agency problems. Consequently, analysts from shareholder-based countries are likely to be 
reluctant to cover family-dominated firms.  
In contrast, given that a majority of public firms are family-controlled in the rest of world 
except for a few shareholder-based countries including the US and the UK (Claessens et al., 
2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999), brokerage houses from stakeholder-based 
countries (e.g., Germany, France, Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, or Taiwan) are unlikely to 
operate under unfavorable characterization of family-dominated firms. Faccio and Lang’s (2002) 
work on the ultimate ownership and control of publicly traded firms in 13 Western European 
countries shows distinct differences between the UK and continental Europe in terms of their 
dominant governance models. According to their findings, while public firms in the UK are 
mostly widely held (63.08%), the family is the largest shareholder of firms in France (64.82%) or 
Germany (64.62%). Accordingly, unlike brokerage houses from shareholder-based countries, 
those from stakeholder-based countries are likely to see family dominance as a less critical 
problem as well as a less negative signal in that their decisions should be guided by their home-
based governance model (Luo et al., 2008). In other words, their decisions on which firms to 
follow are likely to be less influenced by a firm’s family dominance, compared to brokerage 
houses from shareholder-based countries. Thus, I suggest the following hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 2: Brokerage houses founded in shareholder-based countries are less likely to follow 
family-dominated firms than those founded in stakeholder-based countries.  
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Analysts’ Ratings of Family-dominated Firms  
By defining what is seen as appropriate in a specific type of situation (March & Olsen, 
2004) and directing attention to specific features of social situations (Ocasio, 1997), institutional 
logics influence the ways that individuals or organizations give meaning to their social reality 
and organize their material life (Friedland & Alford, 1991). A wealth of empirical studies have 
shown the strong link between institutional logics and organizational behaviors in the diffusion 
of a variety of organization forms or practices, such as organizational founding (Haveman & Rao, 
1997; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), merger and acquisition (Thornton, 2001), corporate board 
reform (Shipilov et al., forthcoming), executive succession (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), 
executive compensation (Zajac & Westphal, 2004), external contracting (Lounsbury, 2007), 
multidivisional structure (Thornton, 2002), and choices of foreign joint venture partners (Luo et 
al., 2008). While the primary focus of these studies has been almost exclusively on logic-driven 
organizational behaviors, little attention has been devoted to the issue of how individuals’ 
cognition is guided by institutional logics. However, given that institutional logics influence 
behavior by influencing cognition, it is necessary to understand cognitive processes inherent in 
institutional logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). 
Here, by examining how multiple logics influence individual analysts’ forecasts and 
recommendations of family-dominated firms, I attempt to understand the mechanisms through 
which prescriptive and evaluative dimensions from the social world are introduced into 
individual cognition. Their professional judgments through earnings forecasts and buy/sell 
recommendations, which I refer to as analyst ratings, are consequential in influencing investor 
opinion for a firm’s stocks (Ajinkya, Atiase, & Gift, 1991; Stickel, 1985, 1992; Womack, 1996; 
Zuckerman, 1999; 2000). For instance, to avoid the negative consequences of negative earnings 
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surprises, executives and investor relations departments devote substantial efforts to the 
management of analyst expectations (Matsumoto, 2002; Rao & Sivakumar, 1999; Westphal & 
Clement, 2008).  
Profession-based Logic. As a Global Investor Opinion Survey undertaken by McKinsey 
& Company (2002) shows, corporate governance is of great concern for institutional investors. 
The survey reported that corporate governance issues are central to investment decisions, 
particularly in emerging markets rather than in developed ones. For example, for the question of 
“how important is corporate governance relative to financial issues, e.g., profit performance and 
growth potential, in evaluating which companies you will invest in?”, an overwhelming majority 
of investors answered “equally important” (61%) or “more important” (21%) in Asia, compared 
to respectively 50% and 7% in North America.
1
 In the survey, investors’ comments, like “Our 
investment group would never approve an investment in a company with bad governance,” and 
“Good governance is a qualitative cut-off criterion,” all point to the significance of corporate 
governance in their investment decisions. Scholarly research also supports investors’ negativity 
towards poor corporate governance (Bushman et al., 2005; Chang et al., 2000; Healy et al., 1999; 
Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Lang et al., 2004; Lang & Lundholm, 1996). A study of Indian business 
groups by Khanna and Palepu (2000), for example, showed foreign investors’ avoidance of 
Indian firms affiliated with business groups where there is the lack of transparency due to 
complex ownership structure and inter-firm transactions within a business group. Accordingly, 
firms with poor corporate governance are likely to encounter difficulties in raising external 
finance or servicing external debts.  
                                                          
1 The survey item about investors’ willingness to pay a premium for a well-governed company showed a 
similar pattern. According to its results, institutional investors are willing to pay 20-25% premium on 
average for companies exhibiting high governance standards in Asia, compared to 12-14% in North 
America and Western Europe.  
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Under the profession-based logic, analysts are supposed to serve investors’ economic 
values by providing an independent and objective assessment of information influencing the 
future price of a stock. They are expected to act as surrogates who represent investor beliefs 
(Zuckerman, 1999; 2000), which is embodied in the assumption of empirical finance and 
accounting research that analyst expectations are seen as a proxy for investor beliefs (Abarbanell, 
Lanen, & Verrecchia, 1995; Brown, 1993; Lang & Lundholm, 1996). It seems clear that they 
devote a great deal of their time and attention to what investors are concerned about, such as 
corporate governance. Accordingly, investors’ great concern about poor corporate governance 
may lead analysts to rate family-dominated firms unfavorably because those firms are usually 
characterized by the relative lack of transparent financial disclosures and accounting standards 
(Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983), deficiency of board independence and effectiveness, and 
inactive use of stock-based executive compensation. Because of poor corporate governance and 
the high potential of agency problems, analysts may believe that the benefit from any resulting 
increase in share value of family-dominated firms is unlikely to serve investors (Lang et al., 
2004), which encourages them to downgrade their forecasts or recommendations for those firms. 
Thus, the perspective of viewing analysts as professional surrogates for their client suggests the 
following hypothesis regarding individual analysts’ ratings of family-dominated firms:  
 
Hypothesis 3:  The greater a firm’s family-dominance, the less favorably analysts rate it, 
regardless of their brokerage houses’ country origins.  
 
National Corporate Governance Logic. Institutions are “inhabited” by people through 
work activity, social interaction, and local meaning-making (Hallett, 2010; Hallett & Ventresca, 
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2006). Although individual analysts evaluate firms by their own preferences and discretion, their 
evaluations are still bound by the systematic forces, such as the structure, culture, training, and 
HRM practices of their brokerage house (Fleischer, 2009). In this sense, there may be different 
views or interpretations, not one common view, of corporate governance structure across 
analysts from different brokerage houses of which cognitive and normative frameworks 
regarding appropriate governance models may be under the influence of their home institutional 
environments. Depending on the logics of appropriate corporate governance that underlie their 
professional work, individual analysts may differently evaluate a particular type of ownership 
structures or control mechanisms in their everyday work.  
For instance, analysts from shareholder-based brokerage houses may view family-
dominated firms as being subject to more serious conflicting interests between principals (the 
founding family versus minority shareholders) than typical agency problems between principal 
and agent (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton & Jiang, 2008). From their cognitive and normative 
framework, family owners may be perceived as having the incentives and the power to exploit 
the remaining shareholders by concealing or manipulating important information and pursuing 
family interests and agendas at the expense of shareholder returns (Davis, Schoorman & 
Donaldson, 1997; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Accordingly, they are more likely to have an 
unfavorable view of family-dominated firms, which can be expressed into projecting their 
earnings forecasts and issuing their buy/sell recommendations. In contrast, analysts from 
stakeholder-based brokerage houses may be less sensitive to the issue of family dominance in 
evaluating firms’ prospects in that such governance structure is widespread in their economies 
(Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999). Moreover, because of their 
familiarity and experience with family dominance, the concentrated shareholding or 
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combinations of ownership and control that prevail in family-dominated firms may not be 
viewed as specific problematic situations. As a result, unlike the profession-based logic, the 
diversity of national corporate governance systems suggests that different types of cognitive and 
normative interpretations may be embedded in the same signal of family dominance, depending 
on the dominant logic that operates in their organizations and institutional environment. Thus, I 
propose:  
 
Hypothesis 4: Analysts from brokerage houses founded in shareholder-based countries rate 
family-dominated firms more unfavorably than those from brokerage houses 
founded in stakeholder-based countries.  
 
Moderating Mechanisms of the Relationship between Analyst Coverage or Rating and Family-
dominated Firms  
Even if actors accept a certain institutional logic, the degree to which they rely on that 
logic in their decision-making and evaluation will depend on their differential experience, 
identities, interests, and preferences (Lok, forthcoming; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), which in 
turn arise from their embeddedness in potentially contradictory, multiple institutional logics 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991). Given that social structure defines the set of opportunities and 
constraints for agency but, at the same time, agents’ choices collectively affect structural change 
(Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 1992), the perspective of acknowledging the partial autonomy of 
individual or organizational agency needs to be further developed in the institutional logic 
approach (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Such research may differentiate itself from earlier work by 
moving away from a focus on the role of institutional logics as the shaping forces of individual 
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or organizational behavior to the interplay between agency and institutional structure.  
Here, I examine under which circumstances individual analysts or their brokerage houses 
are either relatively independent of or more constrained by prevailing institutional logics. 
Specifically, I propose that logics’ applicability to analyst coverage and ratings may be 
dependent on the following three different aspects of contingencies: (1) from the intermediary 
side, the reputation of both analysts and their brokerage houses; (2) from the seller side, a firm’s 
legitimacy signaling through the adoption of independent directorships or its CEO’s educational 
background; and (3) from the buyer side, the business group structure in the national-level 
investor environment.  
Reputation. To succeed, professionals and their organizations must develop a good 
reputation as a trustworthy, knowledgeable, and experiential expert. As the client “cannot judge 
the expert’s advice or reports on substance” (Starbuck, 1992: 731), social proofs of expertise, 
such as reputation or status, are extremely important in evaluating professionals’ expertise claim 
that they have a better professional knowledge and service than others (Greenwood, Li, Prakash 
& Deephouse, 2005; Podolny, 1993; Rao, Greve & Davis, 2001). In the analyst profession, the 
importance of reputation has been demonstrated to be associated with professional career success 
(Hong & Kubik, 2003) and higher compensation (Wall Street Journal, 1991, 1993). Particularly, 
as analysts are in a business of predicting the unknown future, it seems obvious that forecast 
accuracy is the most important criterion for determining the reputation and credibility of 
individual analysts and their brokerage firms. As a matter of fact, empirical evidence showed that 
analysts with a good reputation tend to have higher forecasting accuracy (Brown & Chen, 1991; 
Chan, Ikenberry, Lakonishok, & Lee, 2008; Hayward & Boeker, 1998; Stickel, 1992).  
Such solid connections between analysts’ reputation and performance suggest that 
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analysts who have a good reputation may be less dependent on the logic’ influence when 
evaluating family-dominated firms for two main reasons. First, favorable reputations give 
analysts discretion and independence over their decisions and evaluations (Hayward & Boeker, 
1998; Stickel, 1990). Hayward and Boeker (1998), for instance, found that professional 
reputations led analysts to reduce their dependence on corporate finance, the most powerful 
department within their professional firms. Stickel (1990) showed that forecasts by high-
reputation analysts are less likely to follow the crowd and are less predictable than those by 
others. This finding suggests that greater reputations may enable analysts to be less constrained 
by prevailing logics and focus on issuing unbiased and objective ratings. Second, given that, as 
Villalonga and Amit (2006: 386) pointed out, “whether family firms are more or less valuable 
than nonfamily firms remains an open question,” analysts who have a greater reputation may put 
less weight on family dominance in their evaluations. In fact, there is mixed evidence regarding 
the association between family dominance and firm value (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Bertrand, 
Johnson, Samphantharak & Schoar, 2008; Claessens et al., 2002; Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003; 
Holderness & Sheehan, 1988; Morck, Yeung & Yu, 2000; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
Inconclusive and conflicting evidence about the impact of family ownership and management on 
firm value implies that analysts’ negative interpretations of family dominance may lead to higher 
forecasting errors. Thus, even though the profession-based logic induces them to negatively 
evaluate potential agency problems of family-dominated firms, high-reputation analysts who 
tend to produce more accurate forecasts may be more independent of the logic’s influence than 
low-reputation analysts. Especially, the historical context that a majority of successful companies 
are family-dominated in Korea (Chang, 2003; Chang & Hong, 2002) and Taiwan (Luo & Chung, 
2005), may further induce high-reputation analysts to devote little attention to family dominance. 
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Thus, I propose that, because of high independence that favorable reputations confer and 
inconclusive evidence regarding the relationship between family dominance and firm value, 
high-reputation analysts and brokerage houses are likely to have less negative attitudes towards 
the family governance model, compared to those with low reputation.  
 
Hypothesis 5a:  The negative relationship between family dominance and analyst coverage is 
weaker for brokerage houses with greater reputation than others. 
  
Hypothesis 5b:  The negative relationship between family dominance and analyst ratings is 
weaker for analysts with greater reputation than others.  
 
Legitimacy Signaling. A firm’s corporate governance is observed attentively and 
constantly by a variety of constituents, including managers, employees, board members, 
competitors, regulators, lawmakers, the media, accountants, investors, and securities analysts . 
Because of their great concern over the issue of who owns and controls a firm, symbolic actions 
undertaken by the firm to inform those constituents of conformity to prevailing institutional 
logics of corporate governance have been suggested as a critical factor in improving not only 
their opinions of that firm (Carter, 2006; Certo, 2003; Elsbach, 1994; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; 
Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Stevens, Steensma, Harrison, & Cocharn, 2005; Westphal & Zajac, 
2001) but also its financial performance itself (Westphal & Zajac, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 
2004; Zott & Quy, 2005; Zuckerman, 1999). For example, Zajac and Westphal (2004) showed 
that symbolic engagement in the agency logic of corporate control – adoption of long-term 
incentive plans and use of agency language with alignment of managerial and shareholder 
interests – led to favorable stock market reactions, regardless of the actual implementation of 
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these compensation practices. Similarly, Fiss and Zajac (2004) and Westphal and Zajac (2001) 
provided evidence that, to demonstrate rigorous, high-quality corporate control over managerial 
behavior propelled by the logic of a shareholder value maximization, firms relied on a vehicle of 
impression management by engaging in decoupling between the adoption and implementation of 
shareholder-centered governance practices as a response to institutional pressures.  
This symbolic perspective on corporate governance suggests that analysts’ evaluations 
for family-dominated firms are influenced by firms’ actions to exhibit the appearance of 
conformity to what constitutes appropriate behavior. Specifically, I examine how two kinds of 
firms’ legitimacy signaling that are, under the shareholder model logic, interpreted as positive 
may weaken the negative association between family dominance and professional judgments in 
brokerage firms from shareholder-based countries: the appointment of independent directors to 
the board and the management by CEOs with graduate degrees from elite business schools in the 
United States.  
From the shareholder-based governance model, an independent director who is an 
outsider of the firm is a critical component of achieving and maintaining high standards of 
corporate governance because she or he is expected to bring unbiased opinions and diverse 
experience to the firm’s decision-making processes and monitor conflicts of interest that occur 
between shareholders and management by exerting independent control over management 
decision and behavior (Carpenter, Gelekanycz & Sanders, 2004; Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 
1996). Empirical evidence supports that independent directors act as an effective monitoring 
device in determining a firm’s strategic actions, such as restructuring (Johnson, Hoskisson & Hitt, 
1993), takeovers (Byrd & Hickman, 1992), and executive compensation (Bilimoria & Piderit, 
1994; Vafeas, 2000). However, unlike in the shareholder-based countries, independent directors 
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had not been existent or active in most Korean and Taiwanese firms until the late 1990s, as 
typical in most emerging economies (Rhee & Lee, 2008). Such lack of independent directors was 
criticized by international finance community, like the IMF (International Monetary Fund), as 
one of the major problems characterizing poor corporate governance in these countries.  
Given of high potentiality of severe agency problems in family-dominated firms, the 
appointment of independent directors to the board may signal a significant governance change to 
their constituents, exhibiting the acceptance of the shareholder-oriented governance model. In a 
study of board composition in large Korean firms, for example, Rhee and Lee (2008) illuminated 
the signaling impact of independent directors on the growth of foreign ownership. With this 
reasoning, I propose that the adoption of independent directors is likely to make securities 
analysts from shareholder-based countries less negative about a firm’s family-dominated 
governance structure, weakening the unfavorable professional judgments against family-
dominated firms driven by their home-based institutional logic.  
 
Hypothesis 6a: In brokerage houses from shareholder-based countries, the negative relationship 
between family dominance and analyst coverage is weaker for firms with 
independent directors than those without them.  
 
Hypothesis 6b: In brokerage houses from shareholder-based countries, the negative relationship 
between family dominance and analyst ratings is weaker for firms with 
independent directors than those without them.  
 
 
As the basic characteristics of CEOs, such as their educational background, previous 
36 
 
careers, and leadership styles, are the information to which analysts pay close attention, I also 
expect the signaling effect of CEOs’ educational background on analysts’ professional judgment 
of family-dominated firms in brokerage houses from shareholder-based countries. The important 
role of executive education in corporate strategy and behavior has been highlighted from a 
variety of perspectives. Viewing organizations as reflections of the values, beliefs, and abilities 
of their top leaders, upper echelons research suggests that executive experiences and education 
play a key role in shaping their values, beliefs, and abilities (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
Institutional research on corporate governance showed that CEOs with graduate degrees from 
elite business schools are more likely to adopt the certain types of practices, such as 
multidivisional organizational forms (Palmer, Jennings & Zhou, 1993) and stock option pay 
(Sanders & Tuschke, 2007), or draw on a professionally based leadership model rather than 
family leadership model in emerging economies (Chung & Luo, 2008). Accordingly, analysts 
may expect CEOs with a management education from the United States to possess different 
knowledge backgrounds, values, and mindsets from those without such educational background. 
Those CEOs, for instance, may be viewed to be less embedded in taken-for-granted governance 
structure in local markets and more open towards shareholder-based governance practices they 
have learned in their graduate business education (Chung & Luo, 2008; Sanders & Tuschke, 
2007). Furthermore, analysts may believe that CEOs with graduate business degrees from the 
United States are more likely than those without such educational backgrounds to compel their 
firms to exercise governance reforms identified as standards in the global financial marketplace. 
Consequently, CEOs’ graduate business degrees in the United States are likely to provide 
securities analysts , particularly from shareholder-based countries, with high expectations that 
these CEOs should change their family-dominated governance structure, which may lead to 
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weakening the unfavorable professional judgments against family-dominated firms driven by 
their home-based institutional logic. Thus, I suggest the following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 7a: In brokerage houses from shareholder-based countries, the negative relationship 
between family dominance and analyst coverage is weaker for firms led by CEOs 
with graduate business education in the United States than those led by CEOs 
without such education.  
 
Hypothesis 7b: In brokerage houses from shareholder-based countries, the negative relationship 
between family dominance and analyst ratings is weaker for firms led by CEOs 
with graduate business education in the United States than those led by CEOs 
without such education.  
 
Differences of prevailing business group structures. When South Korea and Taiwan are 
compared to the rest of the world, they share remarkably similar historical backgrounds in the 
development processes of their modern industrial economies (Cumings, 1984; Hamilton & 
Biggart, 1988). For instance, despite inherent disadvantages including the destruction of their 
industrial capacity during World War II, few natural resources, and small land, both countries 
have experienced extraordinary growth largely fueled by industrial exports. As Boisot and Child 
(1996) argued, their economic development model can be characterized as network capitalism 
where interconnected relationships play a significant role in the economic life with more depth 
and more intensity of social embeddedness in comparison with Western model. The centrality of 
such network capitalism is well represented in diversified business groups dominating their 
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economies (Chang, 2003; Chang & Hong, 2002; Chung & Luo, 2008; Luo & Chung, 2005).  
Despite these similarities, a significant difference between two countries is present in the 
structure and control mechanisms of prevailing business groups (Hamilton & Biggart, 1988). 
Korean business groups, known as Chaebol, tend to be large and be governed under the single 
administrative and financial control by a family (Chang, 2003; Chang & Hong, 2002). Even 
though an individual member firm is legally a separate firm, its fate is closely bound to that of 
other group-affiliated firms by rescuing poorly performing affiliates through sharing or 
reallocating technological, managerial, and financial resources. But, unlike highly centralized 
and integrated Korean business groups, Taiwanese business groups tend to be small and 
relatively independent of control by central holding companies (Hamilton & Biggart, 1988). 
Compared to the domino effect of a member firm’s failure in Korea, which usually leads to a 
large bankruptcy of its other group-affiliated firms, group-affiliated firms in Taiwanese business 
groups are less likely to share one another’s failure risks or burdens.  
Accordingly, structural differences of business group membership between two countries 
may be differentially interpreted and evaluated by analysts. As business groups have been 
claimed to be at the heart of transparency problems in many emerging economies due to pyramid 
structures and complex transactions among their affiliates (Khanna & Palepu, 2000), it could be 
more difficult for analysts to achieve and maintain accurate forecasts for group-affiliated firms 
than for non-affiliated firms (Chang et al., 2001). In particular, analysts from American and 
British brokerage houses are likely to be not only unfamiliar with, but hostile to business group 
affiliation under their home-based institutional logic. Thus, given that the strength and depth of 
business group membership is greater in Korea than in Taiwan, analysts from shareholder-based 
countries are likely to be more negative toward group affiliated firms in Korea than in Taiwan.  
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Hypothesis 8a: In brokerage houses from shareholder-based countries, the negative relationship 
between family governance and analyst coverage is stronger for group-affiliated 
firms in South Korea than those in Taiwan.  
 
Hypothesis 8b: In brokerage houses from shareholder-based countries, the negative relationship 
between family governance and analyst ratings is stronger for group-affiliated 
firms in South Korea than those in Taiwan.  
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CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS  
 
I examined the above hypotheses by looking at global analysts’ coverage and ratings of 
all publicly listed firms in South Korea and Taiwan during the period 1996-2005. I set 1996 as 
the first year of this study because the analyst profession has been developed and advanced in 
these two countries since the mid-1990s. The study’s 2005 ending year was determined by data 
availability. Data on global analysts’ coverage of Korean and Taiwanese firms were compiled 
from annual Nelson’s Information Directory of Investment Research. Nelson’s Directories, the 
most complete global source of analyst coverage, provide comprehensive information on the 
profiles of both brokerage houses throughout the world and individual companies covered by at 
least one analyst from those houses. Analyst rating data including earnings forecasts and 
recommendations came from IBES (Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System). IBES began 
collecting analysts’ earnings forecasts and recommendations for U.S. companies in 1976 and for 
international companies in the mid-1980s. Currently, it covers over 45,000 companies from 
about 70 countries. The reputation data of both individual analysts and their brokerage houses 
were collected from Institutional Investor’s Annual Survey of “All-America Research Team”. 
The corporate governance and financial data for Korean firms came from Korea Information 
Service Database and those for Taiwanese firms came from Taiwan Economic Journal Database. 
Finally, supplementary data such as brokerage houses’ founding locations were collected from 
internet search.  
 
Measures  
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Dependent Variables 
The three major activities of an analyst were used as the dependent variables of this 
dissertation: coverage, EPS (earnings per share) forecasts, and stock recommendations. First, the 
analyst coverage was measured by the number of analysts who covered a focal firm. Second, 
EPS forecasts were measured by analyst-by-analyst estimates of a firm’s EPS value for a given 
annual fiscal period. Third, stock recommendations were measured by analyst-by-analyst 
recommendations for a security. IBES standardized different recommendation rating systems 
from different brokerage houses by assigning each rating to one of the five categories in their 
standard set of recommendations. Each of these categories was coded as: 5 = Strong Buy, 4 = 
Buy, 3 = Hold, 2 = Underperform, and 1 = Sell.  
Because I examine the impact of both profession-based and national corporate 
governance-based logics on global analysts’ coverage and ratings of family-dominated firms in 
Korean and Taiwanese stock markets, I constructed two types of measures for each dependent 
variable. To test the influence of the profession-based logic on analyst coverage and ratings, on 
the one hand, the first type measures analyst coverage, forecasts, and recommendations, 
regardless of brokerage houses’ country origins. This measure is consistent with the profession-
based logic which views global analysts as members of a homogeneous professional community 
with a common evaluative framework. On the other hand, to examine the impact of national 
corporate governance logic on analyst coverage and ratings, the second focuses on differences in 
the country origins of brokerage houses because different countries are embedded in different 
normative belief structures and cognitive frameworks regarding appropriate governance models. 
Following a generic categorization scheme of the comparative corporate governance research 
(e.g., Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005; Fiss & Zajac, 2004), I measured analyst coverage and ratings 
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for each of two distinct governance models: shareholder and stakeholder governance models. 
Since, as Stinchcombe (1965) pointed out, the institutional environments at the time of an 
organization’s founding are likely to be imprinted in its routines, values, and preferences, the 
governance model prevailing in the country where brokerage houses were originally founded 
may have long-standing effects on both their decision-making of which firm is appropriate to 
follow and their assessment of a firm’ future value prospects.  
Accordingly, shareholder-based analysts’ activities, which I refer to as SH coverage, SH 
forecasts, and SH recommendations, were measured by coverage and ratings of the analysts of 
which brokerage houses were originally founded in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Australia. Similarly, stakeholder-based analysts’ activities, which I refer to as ST 
coverage, ST forecasts, and ST recommendations, were measured by coverage and ratings of the 
analysts of which brokerage houses were originally founded in continental European countries 
(Germany, France, Netherlands, Switzerland, etc.), Japan, and other Asian countries (Hong Kong, 
South Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand). As a robustness check, to test 
whether the resulting associations between analysts’ activities and family ownership are driven 
by distance effects rather than different governance models, I also employed three alternative 
measures: 1) local analysts’ activities which I refer to as Local coverage, Local forecasts, and 
Local recommendations, 2) foreign analysts’ activities which I refer to as Foreign coverage, 
Foreign forecasts, and Foreign recommendations, and 3) non-local stakeholder-based analysts’ 
activities which I refer to as Non-local ST coverage, Non-local ST forecasts, and Non-local ST 
recommendations.   
Brokerage houses’ decision of which firm to cover is an initial step to trigger analysts’ 
subsequent activities such as earnings forecasts and recommendations. Consequently, whether or 
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not a target firm is covered by analysts is of great concern to both the firm and investors 
(Zuckerman, 1999, 2000), so that this coverage decision is typically made at the research 
department level of brokerage houses. Figure 1 shows the number of analyst coverage events 
during the study period by the countries in which brokerage houses were founded. The UK and 
the US are ranked first and second respectively among foreign countries, followed by 
Switzerland, Netherlands, France, Japan, Germany, and Hong Kong. Brokerage houses from 
other countries, such as Canada, Denmark, India, Ireland, Sweden, and Thailand, played an 
insignificant role in Korean and Taiwanese stock markets, indicating that they had less than 5 
coverage events during the entire study period. In addition, compared to those in Taiwan, local 
brokerage houses in Korea were more actively involved in covering their local firms, which 
suggests that the local analyst profession was more developed in Korea than in Taiwan. 37.58% 
(4,403 out of 11,707 coverage observations) in Korea and 17.93% (1,634 out of 9115 coverage 
observations) in Taiwan were covered by analysts from local brokerage houses during the study 
period.  
Figure 2 presents the annual trend of the proportion of listed firms covered by at least one 
analyst in Korea and Taiwan. During the study period, analysts from over 90 brokerage houses in 
19 countries provided research service for investors, covering a substantial number of Korean 
and Taiwanese listed firms, although the proportion of firms covered by analysts varied from 
year to year. In Korea, 32% of 7,132 firm-year observations were followed by analysts from 94 
brokerage houses (42 shareholder-based and 52 stakeholder-based houses). In Taiwan, 35% of 
5,452 firm-year observations were followed by analysts from 97 brokerage houses (58 
shareholder-based and 39 stakeholder-based houses). These coverage summaries confirm that 
global analysts from both shareholder-based and stakeholder-based governance models actively 
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participated in the Korean and Taiwanese financial markets. In this aspect, the empirical context 
of this study is well-suited to examining how global analysts’ coverage and ratings are 
influenced by both profession-based and national corporate governance-based logics. In addition, 
as Figure 2 shows, analysts’ activities significantly decreased in both Korea and Taiwan in 
around 1997 as a result of the Asian economic crisis, and the collapse of the high-tech bubble in 
the early 2000s also had a more direct impact over the analyst research activities in Taiwan than 
those in Korea. These fluctuations suggest analysts’ high-sensitivity for uncertainties in a 
financial market. The maximum number of analysts covering a firm in a given year was 38 for 
SK Telecom in 2001 in the Korean dataset and 41 for Taiwan Semiconductor in 2001 in the 
Taiwanese dataset.   
Table 4 presents the distributions of analyst recommendations from shareholder-based 
and stakeholder-based brokerage houses for Korean and Taiwanese firms. During the study 
period, 29,111 and 14,164 recommendations were made by global analysts in Korea and Taiwan 
respectively. Consistent with the distribution of analyst coverage in Figure 1, local analysts in 
Korea were actively involved in evaluating their local firms, representing 68.7% of the total 
recommendation observations (20,004 out of 29,111). This was not the case in Taiwan where 
28.9% of the total recommendations were made by local analysts. As expected, “Hold” 
recommendations exhibit the largest proportion among the five categories across analysts from 
different governance models in both countries. In addition, those from shareholder-based 
brokerage houses most often issued both the extremely positive (strong buy) and negative (sell) 
recommendation categories in Korea. In Taiwan, those who most often made the extremely 
positive and negative recommendations were from local brokerage houses and from shareholder-
based ones respectively. Noticeably, the relative proportions among the five recommendation 
45 
 
categories for foreign brokerage houses (shareholder-based and non-local stakeholder-based) are 
very similar between Korea and Taiwan, while those for local analysts were very different 
between these two countries. The dominance of local analysts in Korea is also represented in the 
distributions of analyst forecasts in Table 5. While the three groups (shareholder-based, non-
local stakeholder-based, and local brokerage houses) are relatively equal in the number of 
forecasts in Taiwan, local analysts in Korea represented 79.9% of the total observations (46,673 
out of 58,399).  
 
Independent Variable  
I used the family ownership variable to operationalize a family’s control of the firm. 
Family ownership is not only the most important identifier of a family business but also the most 
prevalent type of governance structure in Korea (Chang, 2003; Chang & Hong, 2002) and 
Taiwan (Luo & Chung, 2005). It was measured as a percentage of shares owned by individual 
family members and other firms controlled by family members. The median values for family 
ownership are 31.6% for Korean firms and 22.7% for Taiwanese firms. Family block-owners are 
the largest shareholder in 83% firm-year observations of the Korean sample and 77% of the 
Taiwanese one. This evidence supports that the family dominance characterizes a majority of 
firms in these two emerging markets.  
 
Moderating Variables  
To identify under which conditions the influence of multiple institutional logics on 
analysts’ coverage and ratings is strengthened or weakened, I measured several moderating 
variables. First, to test Hypothesis 4, which predicted that analysts from shareholder-based 
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brokerage houses tend to rate a firm’s family dominance more unfavorably than those form 
stakeholder-based ones, I constructed a dummy variable, shareholder origin. It was coded as 1 if 
a brokerage house was originally founded in countries with the shareholder-oriented governance 
model, such as the US, the UK, Canada, and Australia, and otherwise as 0. The interaction term 
is represented by multiplying it with the family ownership variable.  
Second, to test Hypotheses 5a and 5b, which examine the extent to which the negative 
evaluations of family dominance are moderated by the reputation of individual analysts and their 
organizations, I measured two reputation variables, star analyst and brokerage reputation, using 
data from Institutional Investor’s Annual Survey of “All-America Research Team.” Based on 
survey responses from fund managers on the services and advice they were getting from research 
analysts, Institutional Investor’s annual survey rankings identify top research analysts in the 
global equity market. If an analyst was recognized as an all-star analyst by the Institutional 
Investor magazine in a given year, the star analyst variable was coded as 1, and otherwise as 0. 
During the study period, 66 and 28 star analysts covered Korean and Taiwanese firms 
respectively. Using the number of star analysts that a brokerage house had, the Institutional 
Investor also provides rankings of brokerage houses’ research reputation at the organizational 
level. If a brokerage house was ranked as a top equity research firm by the Institutional Investor 
magazine in a given year, the brokerage reputation variable was coded as 1, and otherwise as 0. 
During the study period, 20 among over 90 brokerage houses covering Korean or Taiwanese 
firms was ranked as one of top equity research houses one or more times. 18 out of them (e.g., 
Banc of America Securities, Bear Sterns & Co., Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Goldman Sachs, 
J. P. Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, Schroder Securities, etc.) were from 
shareholder-based countries and only 3 brokerage houses (Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche 
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Bank AG, and UBS) were from stakeholder-based countries. 935 (13.46%) out of a total of 6,947 
firm-year observations in Korea and 940 (18.26%) out of 5,148 in Taiwan were covered by one 
or more (a maximum of 18) analysts from high-reputation brokerage houses.
2 
The proportions of 
the ratings by high-reputation brokerage houses and by star analysts were 14.97% and 1.70% of 
the total recommendations (29,111), and 10.52% and 0.92% of the total forecasts (58,399) in 
Korea. In Taiwan, those proportions were 34.96% and 2.67% in the total recommendations 
(14,164), and 37.02% and 2.93% of the total forecasts (28,088) respectively.  
Third, to examine whether analysts’ unfavorable evaluations for family-dominated firms 
is influenced by a firm’s legitimacy signaling, I constructed two interaction terms by multiplying 
the family ownership variable with two dummy variables: a firm's adoption of the independent 
directorship and CEO’s MBA education in the United States. As analysts pay close attention to 
changes in a firm’s governance practices or CEO replacements, these signals could be interpreted 
as the firm’s commitment to changes from the family to the shareholder model, particularly by 
the analysts from shareholder-based brokerage houses. Independent directorship was coded as 1 
if a firm had independent directors, and otherwise as 0. However, it is included only in the 
models of Taiwanese firms because, after the 1997-1998 Asian Economic Crisis, appointing a 
minimum proportion of independent directors to the board became mandatory requirements for 
all public firms in Korea in 1999. In contrast, the independent directorship had been voluntarily 
adopted among Taiwanese firms until the government started to require it in 2005. In Taiwan, 
684 firm-year observations (13.29%) were represented as having independent directors. CEO’s 
US MBA was coded as 1 if the CEO had a graduate degree from a business school in the United 
States, and otherwise as 0. This variable is also available only for the Taiwanese firms with one 
                                                          
2
 30.91% firm-year observations in Korea and 33.14% in Taiwan were covered by one or more analysts from low-
reputation brokerage houses. 
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year (2005) missing data at the end of the study period, so that Hypotheses 7a and 7b could not 
be tested for Korean firms. In Taiwan, 159 (4.84%) out of 3,286 firm-year observations were 
coded as having CEOs with a MBA degree from US business schools.  
Finally, to test Hypothesis 8a and 8b, which predicted that analysts’ negative view of 
family ownership is stronger for group-affiliated firms in Korea than those in Taiwan, the 
interaction term was constructed as the product of the family ownership and the business group 
affiliation. Business group affiliation was measured by whether or not a firm is a member of top 
30 business groups in Korea and top 100 business groups in Taiwan in respective years, 
following the approach that each government of these two countries uses to identify its major 
business groups.  
 
Control Variables  
I controlled for a set of variables that have been shown to be important in prior studies of 
analysts. As more demands for analyst research services are expected for bigger and older firms 
(Bhushan, 1989), a firm’s size and age were included to capture their potential impact on 
analysts’ activities. Firm size was measured by total assets (logged) and firm age was 
represented by a variable (logged) that increased by 1 for each year since a firm’s listing. Two 
performance-related variables, ROA (return on assets) and R&D intensity, were included in the 
models because analysts tend to focus on high-performing firms. R&D intensity was measured as 
ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales and is included only in the models of Taiwanese firms as 
its large proportion (79.4%) is missing in the Korean data. A firm’s export ratio and foreign 
investor ownership were included in the models, since global analysts’ activities are likely to be 
influenced by the degree of a firm’s commitment in foreign markets. Export ratio was measured 
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as the ratio of foreign sales to total sales and foreign investor ownership was measured by a 
percentage of shareholding by foreign investors. A firm’s debt/equity ratio, which is one of the 
major concerns from an investor’s standpoint, was constructed by dividing its total liabilities by 
stockholders’ equity. In the analyses of analysts’ forecasts and recommendations, I included one 
additional control variable, the number of forecasts or recommendations of a focal firm in a 
given year, to capture any potential effects of the amount of analysts’ attention given to the firm. 
Finally, a large number of industry and year dummy variables were included in each model to 
capture potential industry- and time-specific effects on analysts’ activities. Since the study period 
is from 1996 to 2005, 9 year dummy variables were developed as controls for each year and the 
reference year was 2005. I constructed 54 industry dummy variables in the Korean dataset 
according to the 2-digit Korean Standard Industrial Classification (KSIC) codes and 19 variables 
in the Taiwanese dataset by using the 2-digit Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) classification.  
 
Models   
As the analyst coverage is defined as the number of analysts who covered a firm in a 
given year, I estimated negative binomial models to predict it (Rock, Sedo, & Willenborg, 2001). 
Whereas Poisson distributions commonly used to model count data assume identical mean and 
variance, the variances of the analyst coverage count variables were much larger than their 
means. Because of this over-dispersion, negative binomial models were preferred. In analyses 
not reported here, I also used Poisson regression models to estimate the number of analyst 
coverage events and found similar results to those reported here. Furthermore, as a robustness 
check, I estimated binomial logit models to predict whether or not a firm is covered by at least 
one analyst by transforming the analyst coverage counts into dichotomous variables. I found that 
the results were very similar. Random-effects models were used in the analyses of the analyst 
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coverage because a substantial number of firms with no analyst coverage during the study period 
would be dropped from the estimation sample in fixed-effects models. I believe that those firms 
that no analyst covered for multiple years are relevant in assessing the validity of my arguments. 
In analyses not reported here, I also ran fixed-effects models and found the results were very 
similar to those reported here. The final sample of the coverage dataset for Korean firms contains 
6,947 firm-year observations for 884 companies and the Taiwanese one has 5,148 observations 
for 779 companies. The descriptive statistics and correlations of these two datasets are reported 
in Tables 6 and 7. 
In the analyses of analysts’ recommendations and earnings forecasts, I selected the 
analyst-firm rating as the unit of analysis, instead of the firm-year aggregated rating, because this 
study examines how individual analysts rate a firm’s family dominance rather than what a firm’s 
overall rating should be. In other words, given the main purpose of analyzing analysts’ ratings is 
how prescriptive dimensions from multiples logics are introduced into individual analysts’ 
ratings, the approach of taking individual ratings as the unit of analysis allows me to test whether 
different analysts evaluate the same level of family ownership in a different way. Accordingly, 
multiple ratings of the same firms in a given year were observed in the structure of both 
recommendation and forecasts data. As the recommendation ratings were coded as ordinal 
variables from 1 to 5, ordered logistic regressions were used to identify predictors of analysts’ 
recommendations. The final sample of the recommendation ratings for Korean firms has 29,111 
analyst-firm ratings and the Taiwanese one contains 14,154 ratings. The descriptive statistics and 
correlations of these two recommendation datasets are reported in Tables 8 and 9.  
To examine the relationships between a firm’s family ownership and analysts’ ratings, 
their EPS estimates were also used as a dependent variable in OLS regressions. The final sample 
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of the forecast ratings for Korean firms consists of 58,399 analyst-firm forecasts and the 
Taiwanese one has 28,088 ratings. The descriptive statistics and correlations of these two 
forecasts datasets are reported in Tables 10 and 11. 
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSES AND RESULTS  
  
 In this chapter, I report and interpret the results of my statistical analyses to test how a 
firm’s family control is associated with analysts’ coverage, recommendations, and forecasts. The 
additional analyses of evaluating the robustness of the results are also reported.  
 
Analysts’ Coverage  
Table 12 presents the results of random-effects negative binomial models predicting the 
number of analysts who covered Taiwanese firms. The results shown in Model 1 of Table 12 
provide strong support for Hypothesis 1b, which predicted that firms with greater family control 
are less likely to be covered by analysts, regardless of the origins of their brokerage houses. For 
one standard deviation increase in a firm’s family ownership (16.61, meaning 16.61% of total 
shares), the number of analysts covering the firm would be expected to decrease by a factor of 
88 % (β= - 0.008, exp (-0.008×16.61) = 0.88), holding all other variables constant. Whereas 
Model 1 shows the negative association between levels of a firm’s family ownership and the 
number of analysts covering that firm, Models 2 and 3 indicate that analysts from the 
shareholder-based brokerage houses are less likely to follow family-dominated firms than those 
from the stakeholder-based brokerage houses, supporting Hypothesis 2. In Model 2, the 
shareholder-based analyst coverage was significantly and negatively associated with family 
ownership (z = -3.07, p = 0.002), but Model 3 shows little statistically significant evidence of the 
impact of family ownership on the stakeholder-based analyst coverage, although its coefficient is 
still negative (z = -1.46, p = 0.14). As a robustness check, to test whether the resulting difference 
between two different governance models is driven by the impact of distance, I also used 
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alternative coverage measures in Models 4 and 5 by differentiating foreign analysts from local 
analysts. In terms of the impact of family ownership on stakeholder-based analyst coverage, 
Model 4 with the exclusion of coverage from local Taiwanese brokerage houses produces the 
results similar to those in Model 3. Model 5 which predicted analyst coverage from foreign 
brokerage houses shows the results similar to those in Model 1.
3
 These empirical results confirm 
that, although analysts as a whole are reluctant to cover family-dominated firms, the extent of a 
firm’s family ownership has different impacts on shareholder-based and stakeholder-based 
analyst coverage.
 
 
Hypothesis 5a is confirmed in Models 6 and 7: high-reputation brokerage houses are less 
negative towards family dominance, compared to others. Whereas a firm’s family ownership is 
not a statistically significant variable for predicting the number of analyst coverage from high-
reputation brokerage houses in Model 6, it is a negatively significant predictor for the rest of the 
brokerage houses in Model 7. Models 8 through 11 included the interaction terms between 
family ownership and two types of a firm’s legitimacy signaling (the adoption of independent 
directorship and CEO’ MBA education in the United States). The results do not show support for 
Hypotheses 6a and 7a.  
The results of random-effects negative binomial models for Korean firms are showed in 
Table 13. Unlike in Taiwan (Model 1 in Table 12), the family ownership is not a significant 
predictor of estimating the number of analysts in Korea (Model 1 in Table 13). However, Model 
5 shows foreign analysts’ negative attitudes toward family ownership in their coverage decision-
making, regardless of their country origins. When Models 1 and 5 are taken into account together, 
                                                          
3
 I ran another random-effects negative binomial regression of estimating the effects of family ownership on analyst 
coverage from local brokerage houses, but its results were not produced because a majority of firms were covered by 
only one or two local analysts. Instead, in analyses not reported here, I ran a random-effects logistic regression and 
found the insignificant coefficient of the family ownership on local analyst coverage (z = -1.24, p = 0.21).  
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it is obvious that the coverage from local Korean brokerage houses significantly influences the 
result of Model 1. In fact, 38% of the total coverage observations (4,403 out of 11,707) were 
from local Korean brokerage houses. Thus, Models 1 and 5 offer partial support for Hypothesis 
1b that analysts are less likely to cover family-dominated firms, although local brokerage houses 
show different approaches to evaluating family ownership in their coverage decision-making.
4
 
The results in Models 2 through 4 show strong support for Hypothesis 2 that shareholder-based 
brokerage houses are more negative toward family ownership than stakeholder-based ones. 
Hypothesis 5a was tested by differentiating the analyst coverage between high-reputation 
brokerage houses and the others, and the results in Models 6 and 7 does not show support for it, 
which are inconsistent with those in the above analyses of analyst coverage for Taiwanese firms.  
 
Analysts’ Recommendations  
Table 14 presents the results of the ordered logistic regressions predicting analysts’ 
favorable recommendations for Taiwanese firms. Model 1 shows marginal support (z = -0.002, p 
= 0.074) at the 90% level for Hypothesis 3, which predicted that analysts are likely to rate 
family-dominated firms less favorably, regardless of their brokerage houses’ country origins. 
However, the results shown in Models 2 to 7 offer no support for Hypothesis 4, suggesting that 
there is little difference in assessing a firm’s family ownership across analysts from different 
governance models. According to Models 6 and 7, the interaction term between a firm’s family 
ownership and the dummy variable indicating the shareholder origin is also not significant at the 
95% level. While Model 8 shows the insignificant interaction between a firm’s family ownership 
and brokerage houses’ reputation on analysts’ recommendation ratings, the result shown in 
                                                          
4
 In a random-effects logistic regression of estimating the effects of family ownership on analyst coverage from local 
brokerage houses, the coefficient of the family ownership is positive but not significant.  
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Model 9 indicates that star analysts tend to rate family-dominated firms more unfavorably than 
others. This is the opposite of what Hypothesis 5b predicted. According to Models 10 and 11, 
Hypotheses 6a and 7a, which posited that the relationships between family ownership and 
analysts’ ratings are moderated by a firm’s legitimacy signaling, are not supported.  
The empirical results of the ordered logistic regressions predicting analysts’ favorable 
recommendations for Korean firms are showed in Table 15. Surprisingly, Model 1 indicates that 
analysts tend to rate family-dominated firms more favorably. However, as Models 2 to 4 show, 
this tendency is mostly driven by local analysts. While local analysts tend to view family-
dominated firms in a positive way when making recommendations, those from foreign countries 
do not view family ownership as important information in their ratings. Little difference between 
analysts from shareholder- and stakeholder-based brokerage houses is observed in Models 5 and 
6. Similar to the case in Taiwan above, Hypothesis 4 is not supported. Hypothesis 5b is also not 
supported in Model 7 and 8.  
 
Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts  
Table 16 displays the results of the OLS regressions predicting analysts’ EPS estimates 
for Taiwanese firms. According to Model 1, analysts tend to rate family-dominated firms more 
favorably, which is the opposite of Hypothesis 3’s prediction. While shareholder-based analysts 
are positive toward family-dominated firms in Model 2, those from stakeholder-based foreign 
brokerage houses are negative toward it in Model 4. Model 5 shows that any significant effect of 
a firm’s family ownership on EPS estimates is not found in local analysts’ forecasts. The results 
shown in Models 6 and 7 provide no support for Hypothesis 4, suggesting that analysts from 
shareholder-based brokerage houses are not different from those from stakeholder-based ones in 
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evaluating a firm’s family ownership when estimating its future EPS. Model 9 offers support for 
Hypothesis 5b, which predicted that, compared to others, star analysts pay less attention to a 
firm’s family dominance. In Models 10 and 11, the interaction terms between a firm’s family 
ownership and legitimacy signaling are not statistically significant, so Hypotheses 6a and 7a are 
not supported.  
The results of the OLS regressions predicting analysts’ EPS estimates for Korean firms 
are showed in Table 17. According to Models 1 to 4, analysts from either shareholder- or 
stakeholder-based brokerage houses evaluate family-dominated Korean firms in a very negative 
way, which provides strong support for Hypothesis 3. Little difference between two different 
governance logics is also confirmed in Models 5 and 6. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is not supported. 
Additionally, Hypothesis 5b predicting the moderation of analysts’ reputation is not also 
supported in Models 7 and 8.   
 
Analysts’ Activities and Differences of Business Groups between Korea and Taiwan  
To test Hypotheses 8a and 8b, which posited that the negative view of analysts from 
shareholder-based brokerage houses about family governance is stronger for group-affiliated 
firms in Korea than in Taiwan, I included the interaction term between the family ownership 
variable and the group membership dummy in Table 18. The result shown in Model 3 suggests 
that analysts from shareholder-based brokerage houses are less likely to cover family-dominated 
firms with group affiliation than those without it in Korea, while the interaction term in Model 1 
is positive and not significant in Taiwan. These results provide strong support for Hypothesis 8a, 
which predicted that analysts from shareholder-based brokerage houses evaluate a combination 
of family ownership and business group membership more negatively in Korea than in Taiwan 
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because of stronger connections among member firms in Korean business groups.  
However, Models 5 to 8, which estimated analysts’ recommendations for Korean and 
Taiwanese firms, do not show support for Hypothesis 8b. The interaction terms in Models 5 and 
7 are both negative and not significant. Interestingly, the result shown in Model 8 indicates that 
analysts from stakeholder-based countries make more negative recommendations for a 
combination of family ownership with business group affiliation in Korea. The results for 
analysts’ earnings forecasts in Models 9 to 12 also provide little support for Hypothesis 8b. 
According to Model 10, analysts from stakeholder-based brokerage houses estimated more 
negatively the impact of the combination of family ownership and group membership on its 
future EPS in Taiwan. In Korea, that impact was positively rated by analysts, regardless of their 
country origins. These results are not consistent with what Hypothesis 8b predicted.   
A summary of the empirical results above is given in Table 19. In sum, while the 
hypotheses related to analysts’ coverage are mostly supported, little support is founded for those 
related to analysts’ recommendations and earnings forecasts.   
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation examined how multiple institutional logics affect professional 
evaluations in the globalized profession of securities analysts. It aimed to complement the 
existing literature of securities analysts, which has focused primarily on how their evaluations 
are functionally value-added to the client or dysfunctionally biased by conflicts of interests, by 
developing the institutional logic approach of analysts’ professional activities. Drawing upon 
recent theoretical developments on the simultaneous embeddedness of actors in multiple 
institutional logics, I proposed that analysts’ three major activities – coverage, earnings forecasts, 
and stock recommendations are influenced by both the profession-based logic and the logics of 
national corporate governance. The proposed hypotheses were tested by looking at global 
analysts’ activities for family-dominated firms in Korea and Taiwan during the period 1996 – 
2005. The results shown in the analyses of analysts’ coverage decision confirm that both 
profession-based logic at the global level and corporate governance-based logic at the national 
level are at work. Those from the analyses of individual analysts’ ratings for family-dominated 
firms, however, were mixed and inconsistent between different predictors, two professional 
ratings (earnings estimates and recommendations), and those two emerging countries, suggesting 
that there is more to be developed about analysts’ professional ratings.   
First, the results showed that the profession-based logic served as a fundamental basis of 
guiding analysts’ professional decisions and evaluations. In the analyses of their coverage, for 
example, it was consistently shown in both Korean and Taiwanese stock markets that analysts 
covered larger, older, high-performing, R&D-oriented, and highly foreign investor-owned 
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companies, regardless of the country origins of their brokerage houses.
5
 A firm’s performance 
and foreign ownership were also the robust predictors of making analysts’ favorable earnings 
forecasts and recommendations across all models in these two countries. These findings confirm 
that the profession-based logic, which views analysts as an independent and objective monitoring 
device for their clients, plays a critical role in guiding how they evaluate a firm.   
Second, under the profession-based logic, I proposed two competing hypotheses about 
the association between analysts’ coverage and a firm’s family control. Unlike the agency 
theorists’ (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976) claim that analysts respond favorably to investors’ 
demands for monitoring family-dominated firms with potentially high agency problems, the 
empirical results showed strong evidence that global analysts are reluctant to cover family-
dominated firms in emerging markets. This outcome could be because covering family-
dominated firms imposes high risk of false predictions to them due to great difficulties of 
obtaining timely and reliable information. 
By differentiating global brokerage houses according to their home-country governance 
models, I also found that not all analysts share the same evaluative framework of which firm to 
cover, when a strong institutionally-loaded signal, such as a family control, is introduced. The 
results clearly showed that the degree of a firm’s family ownership was more negatively 
associated with the number of coverage events from shareholder-based brokerage houses than 
that from stakeholder-based houses. These findings were consistent for both Korean and 
Taiwanese firms, which suggests that brokerage houses from shareholder-based countries such as 
the US and the UK view a family’ dominant control in a firm as less appropriate than do those 
                                                          
5
 Debt-to-equity ratio among the control variables was the only one that showed the inconsistent results between 
these two countries as a predictor of the number of analysts covering a firm. While analysts were less likely to cover 
firms with high debt-to-equity ratio in Taiwan, they were more likely to cover those firms in Korea. This may be 
caused by differences of corporate finance practices between these two countries, but remains to be further 
examined.  
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from shareholder-based countries. Furthermore, this indicates that national corporate governance 
models as distinct institutional logics would provide analysts with principles of appropriateness 
in defining which firm should be covered. Taken together, these results suggest the following 
conclusion: the profession-based logic plays a basic role in guiding analysts’ decisions of 
whether to add or drop a particular firm in their portfolio, but when their interpretations of a 
signal’s appropriateness vary across their home-country governance models, the logics of 
national business systems are evoked in addition to the profession-based logic in their decision-
making.     
Third, the results showing the impact of a firm’s family ownership on analysts’ ratings 
were mixed and inconsistent between their earnings estimates and recommendations, different 
predictors, and Korean and Taiwanese firms, except two types of critical information from the 
profession-based logic – a firm’s performance and foreign investor ownership. In the analyses of 
Taiwanese firms, no association between a firm’s family ownership and analysts’ 
recommendations is found across different country origins of brokerage houses, and the results 
of analysts’ forecasts also showed the opposite of what I proposed. In the analyses of Korean 
firms, those only from local brokerage houses showed the significantly positive association 
between their recommendations and a firm’s family ownership, and all analysts, regardless of the 
origins of their brokerage houses, rated future earnings of family-dominated firms unfavorably. 
A possible explanation for these conflicting findings could be that individual analysts evaluate 
the legitimacy of family-dominated firms not only on the basis of the institutional logic 
prevailing in their home institutional environment, but also on the basis of what they have 
learned from their prior experience in different institutional environments. As Fleischer (2009: 
561) found from her interviews with securities analysts, “individual ratings are officially left up 
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to the discretion of individual analysts, though one director of research noted that potentially 
important or controversial ratings are sometimes subject to a review by an assembled panel to 
ensure that the analyst is making a fully considered opinion.” This implies that the expert and 
experience that they have learned through their professional career paths may play an important 
role in shaping their evaluative frameworks. Local analysts with prior research experience in 
American or British brokerage houses, for example, may differentially evaluate family-
dominated firms, compared to those without such experience because they could carry the values, 
norms, and beliefs previously identified as important into their evaluative frameworks when 
migrating from shareholder-based brokerage houses to local houses. This experience could lead 
them to see family dominance as less appropriate and evaluate it in a more negative way than 
other local analysts without such experience. In this dissertation, I originally intended to examine 
how analysts’ mobility across different governance models influences their evaluations of 
family-dominated firms. Unfortunately, their mobility information could not be traced because 
IBES changed individual analysts’ unique IDs when they moved from one brokerage house to 
another. As a result, the question of how institutional logics introduce prescriptive dimensions 
into individual professionals’ evaluations could not be fully examined.  
Another possible explanation of these inconsistent findings for analysts’ ratings could be 
that the degree of family ownership could be less salient information in their ratings than in their 
coverage decision because a substantial number of family-owned companies with high agency 
problems could be already dropped in their coverage portfolio. In fact, while the mean of a firm’s 
family ownership in the Korean coverage dataset was 32%, its mean in the Korean 
recommendation and forecasts datasets were 26% and 25% respectively. Similar patterns held 
for the Taiwanese datasets. This possibility needs to be further developed in future research.  
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Fourth, in order to identify under which conditions logics’ applicability to analysts’ 
coverage and ratings is strengthened or weakened, I examined the moderating impact of analysts’ 
reputation, a firm’s legitimacy signaling, and different business group structures at the national 
level on the relationships between analysts’ activities and family ownership. First, the results 
offered partial support for Hypothesis 5a and 5b which predicted that, compared to the others, 
brokerage houses with a good reputation have less negative attitudes towards a firm’s family 
ownership because of high independence that favorable reputation confers and inconclusive 
evidence about the impact of family dominance on firm value. In Taiwan, brokerage houses and 
analysts with a good reputation were showed to give less attention to a firm’s family ownership 
in their coverage decisions and earnings forecasts. It was, however, shown that their reputation 
did not influence analysts’ activities in Korea. These results should be interpreted with caution 
because their reputation is closely tightened with their prediction accuracy which can be verified 
in a remarkably short time. In this sense, this study’s measures of reputation are likely to capture 
analysts’ performance-oriented reputation, rather than status or privilege as sociological concepts. 
Second, the results shown in the analyses of global analysts’ coverage for Taiwanese firms 
provide strong support that the negative view of analysts from shareholder-based brokerage 
houses about family governance is stronger for group-affiliated firms in Korea than in Taiwan. 
The similar results were not found in my analyses of analysts’ recommendations and earnings 
forecasts. Finally, the moderating role of a firm’s legitimacy signaling was not supported in all 
analyses, which indicates that a firm’s adoption of independent directorship or its CEO 
educational background may not be the critical information that analyst pay close attention to in 
their evaluations.  
The findings of this study contribute to the following areas of research. First, this study 
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illustrates how multiple institutional logics influence organizational behavior by demonstrating 
that professional decision-making is under the influence of logics within and outside the 
profession. It confirms that it is essential to simultaneously look at multiple logics to better 
understand how an organization responds to complex institutional contexts. In particular, the 
framework and findings of this study suggest that national corporate governance logics of the 
firms’ home countries could be a source of the unobserved heterogeneity of global analysts. As a 
profession is becoming globalized, the interaction between the profession-based logic and 
national business systems should be taken into account to better understand professional 
decision-making and evaluations.  
Second, the findings of this study about analysts’ coverage decisions confirm the social 
constructionist view of financial market behavior (Zajac & Westphal, 2004). With the 
assumption that analysts are members of a homogeneous community with common professional 
norms, values, and beliefs, prior research on analysts in the finance and accounting literatures 
has focused on firm- or country-specific factors as determinants of analysts’ evaluations. In 
contrast to this view that the analyst profession is governed by the dominant logic of objective 
and independent assessment for clients, this study suggests that the multiplicity of institutional 
logics can lead different analysts to choosing a different course of action. Furthermore, while 
prior research on analysts’ bias focused on how the political considerations of interest and power 
can influence analysts’ evaluations (Hayward & Boeker, 1998; Hong & Kubick, 2002; Lim, 
2001; Lin & McNichols, 1998; Michaely & Womack, 1999; Sargent, 2000; Schack, 2001; 
Westphal & Clement, 2008), this study highlights the role of national corporate governance 
logics as a potential source of the heterogeneity of their professional judgments.  
Finally, this study emphasizes the importance of the comparative approach to the 
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diversity of cross-national corporate governance. Its findings highlight not only the importance 
of home-country governance model in globalized financial markets but also the potential 
problem of treating foreign firms from different countries as a homogeneous category of foreign 
analysts or investors. In long-standing debates around global convergence toward shareholder-
oriented corporate governance model, it has been suggested that the globalization of the analyst 
profession should drive a global convergence of corporate governance because analysts as 
investor surrogates are critical agents who promote shareholder-based governance model. The 
findings of this study, however, indicate that this would not be the case.  
The findings of this study provide several possible extensions for future research. First, 
this dissertation examined brokerage houses’ country origins as a source of heterogeneity in 
analysts’ evaluations of family-dominated firms. It would be also interesting to enquire further 
into individual analyst-level factors, such as their prior job experience and tenure, industry 
specialization, different levels of geographic coverage, or ranks in their organizations (e.g., head 
of a research team or a team member), which may affect their evaluations of family-dominated 
firms. In particular, given that the country origins of brokerage houses were shown to be an 
inconsistent predictor of analysts’ ratings, it would be fruitful to examine those individual factors 
as possible determinants of analysts’ forecasts or recommendations.  
Second, further explanations for the mixed and inconsistent findings of analysts’ ratings 
could be also provided by examining under which circumstances analysts refer to family control 
as critical information. For example, when there is a lack of consensus among analysts or there is 
considerable uncertainty in a financial market, a firm’s family control would make a difference 
in their evaluations. Similarly, when they make an extremely positive or negative forecasts and 
recommendations, they may pay close attention to a family’s involvement in the business.  
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Third, one of the most interesting areas for future research is to examine how country-
specific factors affect analysts’ coverage and evaluations. While this dissertation mainly focused 
on similarities between Korea and Taiwan in investor environments and financial systems, it 
might be also worthwhile to examine how global analysts evaluate differences between these two 
countries in financial markets and corporate governance structure. For instance, since only Korea 
had the financial crisis during the study period, analysts’ sensitivity for extremely uncertain 
situations in a financial system could be compared between these two countries. Additionally, 
the findings of this dissertation suggest the need for examining why local brokerage houses were 
more advanced in Korea than in Taiwan and how different historical development paths of the 
analyst profession in these two countries influence analysts’ activities.  
Fourth, the findings of this study suggest that it would be interesting to investigate the 
role of distance in analysts’ evaluations of family-dominated firms. Prior research in the finance 
literature showed that local analysts have significant information advantage over foreign analysts 
and tend to make more precise earnings forecasts because distance reduce the quality of the 
information that analysts have (Bae, Stulz, & Tan, 2008). One of the interesting questions for 
future research would be whether distance serves as local analyst advantage or a source of 
analyst bias in evaluating family-dominated firms in emerging markets.  
Fifth, a family business could be defined by multiple dimensions (Chua, Chrisman & 
Sharma, 1999). While this dissertation focused on family ownership as the primary identifier of a 
family business, future research should examine how global analysts evaluate other components 
of a family’s involvement in the business, such as family management or trans-generational 
succession. In particular, the question of how analysts evaluate a family firm could be fully 
understood by examining which combination of family ownership, management, and succession 
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analysts evaluate in the most negative way and whether analysts from different governance 
models evaluate those combinations in a similar or different way. As a related topic, the issue of 
how analysts evaluate a combination of family ownership and business group membership 
should be further developed because these two characteristics are the key components of 
corporate governance structure in many emerging markets. 
Finally, the findings of this dissertation call for further research on additional 
characteristics of brokerage houses. While this dissertation focused on the founding locations of 
brokerage houses to examine the impact of national corporate governance logics, their country 
origins could be measured by the location of their owners. The countries where they were 
originally founded are the same as those of their owners for most of the brokerage houses, but 
some brokerage houses were acquired by an investment bank from the country where different 
governance model is dominant. In this regard, whether the founding-based and the ownership-
based approaches produce the same results needs to be further examined. In addition, instead of 
the reputation of brokerage houses in the global market which I used in this dissertation, their 
reputation in a regional market could be used as an alternative measure for testing whether those 
who have a good reputation are less dependent on a logic’ influence, compared to others. This 
approach could provide a possible explanation for inconsistent findings between Korean and 
Taiwanese firms in terms of the moderating role of reputation for the links between family 
control and analysts’ activities. In a similar vein, it would be fruitful to further examine the 
impact of the size of brokerage houses at both global and regional levels. A possible prediction is 
that they are more likely to be shareholder-oriented as their size increases at the global level, 
whereas they are more likely to be stakeholder-oriented as their regional size increases.  
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Everyone in a financial market wants to know the future value prospects of a firm. This is 
the reason that the question of how analysts evaluate a firm is of great importance. Traditionally, 
research on analysts has mostly been prescriptive focusing on their monitoring role as objective 
and independent evaluators of a firm. The purpose of this dissertation was to address this concern 
and to provide an alternative approach to understanding their professional activities by showing 
how their evaluations are institutionally constructed. Particularly, this dissertation focused on 
understanding how they evaluate a family’s involvement in the business in emerging markets. 
Given that family firms are the dominant organizational form in the economic landscape of most 
nations and that the analyst profession works in a globalized context, the investigation of how 
family firms are evaluated by analysts could provide significant information about the operations 
of financial markets around the world. This dissertation suggests the need for research on the 
analyst profession from the perspective of globalization, because their evaluations are not only 
driven by profession-based logics but also under the influence of the logics of national business 
systems.  
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FIGURES AND TABLES  
 
FIGURE 1  
Analyst Coverage Events by Country in Korea and Taiwan during the Period 1996-2005 
a b 
 
 
 
 
 
a. Source: Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research, 1997 – 2006.  
b. 9 Countries (Canada, Denmark, India, Ireland, Norway, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and Thailand) that 
have less than 30 coverage events during the study period are not included.  
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FIGURE 2  
Analyst Coverage of Listed Firms on Korea and Taiwan Stock Exchange markets, 1996-2005
 a 
 
 
 
a. Source: Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research, 1997 – 2006. 
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TABLE 1 
Investors’ Ranks of Attributes of an Equity Research Analyst in Order of Importance a b  
 
Rank 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
1 Industry Knowledge Industry Knowledge Industry Knowledge Industry Knowledge Industry Knowledge 
2 Accessibility/ Responsiveness Integrity/ Professionalism Integrity/ Professionalism Integrity/ Professionalism Integrity/ Professionalism 
3 
Independence from Corporate 
Finance 
Accessibility/ 
Responsiveness 
Accessibility/ 
Responsiveness 
Accessibility/ 
Responsiveness 
Accessibility/ Responsiveness 
4 Useful & Timely calls & visits 
Useful & Timely calls & 
visits 
Useful & Timely calls & 
visits 
Management Access Management Access 
5 Special services Management Access Management Access Special services Special services 
6 Written reports 
Independence from 
Corporate Finance 
Special services 
Useful & Timely calls & 
visits 
Written reports 
7 Management Access Special services Written reports Written reports 
Useful & Timely calls & 
visits 
8 Financial models Written reports 
Independence from 
Corporate Finance 
Communication skills Communication skills 
9 Earnings estimates Financial models Communication skills 
Independence from 
Corporate Finance 
Financial models 
10 Stock selection Communication skills Financial models Financial models 
Management of conflicts of 
interest 
11 Quality of sales force Stock selection Stock selection Stock selection Stock selection 
12 Market making/ execution Earnings estimates Earnings estimates Earnings estimates Earnings estimates 
13  Quality of sales force Quality of sales force Quality of sales force  
14  
Market making/ 
execution 
Market making/ 
execution 
Market making/ 
execution 
 
15  Primary market services Primary market services Primary market services  
 
a. Source: Institutional Investor’s “What Investors Really Want” survey, 2001-2005.  
b. The shaded cells are the attributes that show the client’s anticipations for analysts’ objectivity and independence.  
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TABLE 2 
Global Analysts’ Activities in South Korea and Taiwan, 1996 – 2005 a 
 
 Global Analysts’ Activities 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
South 
Korea 
No. of brokerage houses  25 35 26 29 29 28 33 34 33 41 
No. of countries where brokerage firms were founded  9 10 9 9 8 10 10 10 10 10 
No. of listed firms covered by analysts  
(% out of the total number of publicly listed firms) 
303 
(40.0) 
272 
(35.8) 
157  
(21.9) 
197  
(27.3) 
186  
(26.1) 
176 
(24.8) 
195 
(27.9) 
231 
(33.5) 
263 
(38.4) 
272 
(40.1) 
Average No. of analysts per a firm covered 3.6 3.8 5.1 4.6 4.6 6.2 6.0 4.2 6.9 7.3 
Taiwan 
No. of brokerage houses  28 32 22 30 30 39 38 33 29 30 
No. of countries where brokerage firms were founded  10 9 6 10 10 10 9 9 8 10 
No. of listed firms covered by analysts  
(% out of the total number of publicly listed firms) 
201 
(53.7) 
318 
(80.1) 
211 
(49.0) 
189 
(41.7) 
200 
(38.5) 
115 
(19.3) 
127 
(20.0) 
122 
(18.3) 
211 
(30.4) 
209 
(30.5) 
Average No. of analysts per a firm covered 4.4 3.2 4.3 4.6 5.0 8.2 6.9 5.5 4.7 4.6 
 
a. Source: Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research, 1997 – 2006.  
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TABLE 3 
Local Analysts’ Activities in South Korea and Taiwan, 1996 – 2005 a  
 
 Local Analysts’ Activities 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
South 
Korea 
No. of local brokerage houses  2 1 2 3 4 5 5 5 11 18 
No. of listed firms covered by local analysts  
(% out of the total number of publicly listed firms) 
45 
(5.9) 
41 
(5.4) 
90 
(12.6) 
172 
(23.8) 
160 
(22.4) 
165 
(23.2) 
181 
(25.9) 
214 
(31.1) 
248 
(36.2) 
271 
(39.9) 
Rank among countries in terms of the number of 
firms covered  
5
th
/9 5
th
/10 4
th
/9 1
st
/9 1
st
/8 1
st
/10 1
st
/10 1
st
/10 1
st
/10 1
st
/10 
Taiwan 
No. of local brokerage houses  0 0 0 4 4 5 5 4 5 5 
No. of listed firms covered by local analysts  
(% out of the total number of publicly listed firms) 
0 0 0 
149 
(32.9) 
160 
(30.8) 
80 
(13.5) 
97 
(15.3) 
82 
(12.3) 
158 
(22.8) 
151 
(22.0) 
Rank among countries in terms of the number of 
firms covered  
N/A N/A N/A 1
st
/10 1
st
/10 2
nd
/10 2
nd
/9 2
nd
/9 1
st
/8 1
st
/10 
 
a. Source: Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research, 1997 – 2006.  
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TABLE 4 
Distributions of Analyst Recommendations for Korean and Taiwanese Firms, 1996 – 2005 a 
 
Country 
Analyst 
Recommendation 
Shareholder-based 
Brokerage Houses 
Stakeholder-based  
Brokerage Houses Total 
Non-local Local 
Korea 
Sell (1) 639 (13.4%) 406 (9.3%) 1,283 (6.4%) 2,328 (8.0%) 
Underperform (2) 237 (5.0%) 502 (11.5%) 1,154 (5.8%) 1,893 (6.5%) 
Hold (3) 1,680 (35.4%) 1,236 (28.4%) 8,662 (43.3%) 11,578 (39.8%) 
Buy (4) 750 (15.8%) 1,031 (23.7%) 4,127 (20.6%) 5,908 (20.3%) 
Strong Buy (5) 1,447 (30.4%) 1,179 (27.1%) 4,778 (23. 9%) 7,404 (25.4%) 
Total 4,753 (100%) 4,354 (100%) 20,004 (100%) 29,111 (100%) 
Taiwan 
Sell (1) 778 (14.7%) 418 (8.8%) 400 (9.8%) 1,596 (11.3%) 
Underperform (2) 446 (8.4%) 529 (11.1%) 90 (2.2%) 1,065 (7.5%) 
Hold (3) 1,757 (33.1%) 1,401 (29.4%) 1,385 (33.9%) 4,543 (32.1%) 
Buy (4) 851 (16.1%) 1,104 (23.1%) 567 (13.9%) 2,522 (17.8%) 
Strong Buy (5) 1,470 (27.7%) 1,318 (27.6%) 1,650 (40.3%) 4,438 (31.3%) 
Total 5,302 (100%) 4,770 (100%) 4,092 (100%) 14,164 (100%) 
 
a. Source: IBES (Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System)  
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TABLE 5 
Distributions of Analyst Forecasts for Korean and Taiwanese Firms, 1996 – 2005 a 
 
Country 
Shareholder-based 
Brokerage Houses 
Stakeholder-based  
Brokerage Houses Total 
Non-local Local 
Korea 5,382 (9.2%) 6,344 (10.9%) 46,673 (79.9%) 58,399 (100%) 
Taiwan 9,986 (35.6%) 9,327 (33.2%) 8,775 (31.2%) 28,088 (100%) 
a. Source: IBES (Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System)  
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TABLE 6 
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients – Analyst Coverage for Korean Firms (n =6,947)  
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Analyst coverage  1.62 3.90            
2. SH coverage 0.52 1.51 0.82           
3. ST coverage  1.11 2.79 0.95 0.61          
4. High Reputation coverage 0.43 1.45 0.90 0.84 0.79         
5. Low Reputation coverage  1.20 2.67 0.97 0.74 0.96 0.76        
6. Ln (Size) 19.39 1.61 0.59 0.52 0.54 0.53 0.57       
7. Ln (Age) 2.51 0.82 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.16      
8. ROA 0.58 34.60 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.02 -0.04     
9. Debt/equity ratio 412.43 3109.53 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.02 -0.02    
10. Foreign ownership 7.28 13.16 0.54 0.37 0.56 0.47 0.54 0.40 -0.03 0.06 -0.02   
11. Business group affiliation 0.18 0.38 0.30 0.25 0.29 0.25 0.31 0.43 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.18  
12. Family ownership 32.00 19.41 -0.16 -0.17 -0.14 -0.16 -0.15 -0.19 -0.12 0.05 -0.05 -0.12 0.02 
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TABLE 7 
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients – Analyst Coverage for Taiwanese Firms (n =5,148)  
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Analyst coverage  1.64 3.65                
2. SH coverage 0.66 1.65 0.91               
3. ST coverage  0.98 2.26 0.95 0.74              
4. High Reputation coverage 0.56 1.67 0.92 0.85 0.86             
5. Low Reputation coverage  1.08 2.22 0.95 0.85 0.92 0.75            
6. Ln (Size) 15.91 1.35 0.48 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45           
7. Ln (Age) 1.89 0.98 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.28          
8. ROA 3.61 9.97 0.21 0.16 0.22 0.16 0.23 0.04 -0.23         
9. R&D intensity 1.75 3.46 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.13 -0.11 -0.23 0.07        
10. Export ratio 36.91 36.08 0.15 0.07 0.19 0.13 0.14 -0.14 -0.24 0.20 0.32       
11. Debt/equity ratio 166.93 604.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.26 0.05 -0.10 -0.09 -0.15      
12. Foreign ownership 6.41 10.42 0.40 0.34 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.19 0.07 0.21 0.10 0.12 -0.07     
13. Independent director 0.13 0.34 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.13 -0.28 0.16 0.22 0.24 -0.05 0.07    
14. Business group affiliation 0.55 0.50 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.33 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.09 -0.03 0.13 -0.06   
15. CEO US MBA 0.05 0.21 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.08 0.02 -0.11  
16. Family ownership 25.38 16.45 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.08 -0.05 -0.09 0.11 -0.12 -0.09 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.02 
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TABLE 8 
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients – Recommendations for Korean Firms (n =29,111)  
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Recommendations 3.49 1.17            
2. Ln (Size) 21.24 1.80 0.07           
3. Ln (Age) 2.49 0.89 -0.03 0.12          
4. ROA 3.97 9.10 0.20 -0.02 -0.12         
5. Debt/equity ratio 374.72 2033.27 -0.05 0.11 0.05 -0.10        
6. Foreign ownership 22.91 19.79 0.15 0.45 -0.03 0.27 0.00       
7. Business group affiliation 0.43 0.50 0.03 0.33 0.09 -0.02 -0.05 0.11      
8. Number of recommendations 24.00 20.53 0.10 0.53 -0.11 0.25 -0.02 0.59 0.19     
9. Shareholder origin 0.16 0.37 -0.02 0.16 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.00    
10. Brokerage reputation 0.15 0.36 -0.05 0.21 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.44   
11. Star analysts 0.02 0.13 -0.03 0.09 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.23  
12. Family ownership 26.19 17.45 0.00 -0.45 -0.03 0.03 -0.07 -0.30 0.10 -0.27 -0.10 -0.11 -0.03 
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TABLE 9 
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients – Recommendations for Taiwanese Firms (n =14,164)  
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Recommendations 3.50 1.31                
2. Ln (Size) 17.39 1.40 -0.05               
3. Ln (Age) 1.94 0.91 -0.08 0.38              
4. ROA 9.53 9.45 0.15 -0.25 -0.28             
5. R&D intensity 3.16 4.41 0.01 -0.08 -0.22 -0.01            
6. Export ratio 52.71 36.55 0.07 -0.20 -0.23 0.26 0.21           
7. Debt/equity ratio 137.43 298.95 -0.07 0.45 0.12 -0.28 -0.20 -0.35          
8. Foreign ownership 16.58 13.54 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.15 0.05 0.13 -0.15         
9. Independent director 0.19 0.39 0.04 -0.16 -0.32 0.11 0.12 0.22 -0.11 0.12        
10. Business group affiliation 0.84 0.37 0.00 0.31 0.10 -0.04 0.08 0.11 -0.10 0.07 -0.06       
11. CEO US MBA 0.05 0.21 0.01 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.15 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.19      
12. Number of recommendations 19.39 13.73 0.04 0.41 -0.04 0.12 0.25 0.26 -0.12 0.27 0.05 0.27 -0.02     
13. Shareholder origin 0.37 0.48 -0.10 0.08 0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 0.06 -0.03 -0.15 0.05 -0.01 -0.03    
14. Brokerage reputation 0.35 0.48 -0.10 0.14 0.05 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.06 0.08 -0.02 0.10 0.29   
15. Star analysts 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.08 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.15  
16. Family ownership 23.77 17.22 -0.04 0.07 0.01 -0.02 -0.19 -0.22 0.10 -0.20 -0.02 0.01 0.05 -0.10 0.00 0.02 0.04 
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TABLE 10 
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients – EPS forecasts for Korean Firms (n =58,399)  
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. EPS estimates 7693.26 240332.00            
2. Ln (Size) 21.45 1.86 -0.02           
3. Ln (Age) 2.53 0.88 0.02 0.12          
4. ROA 6.02 8.52 0.12 0.04 -0.10         
5. Debt/equity ratio 312.27 1882.21 0.03 0.11 0.03 -0.14        
6. Foreign ownership 28.49 20.76 -0.01 0.53 -0.01 0.30 0.01       
7. Business group affiliation 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.35 0.09 0.02 -0.08 0.14      
8. Number of forecasts 120.05 102.62 0.00 0.56 -0.02 0.42 -0.04 0.57 0.35     
9. Shareholder origin 0.09 0.29 0.01 0.11 -0.04 -0.05 0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.01    
10. Brokerage reputation 0.11 0.31 -0.01 0.17 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.49   
11. Star analysts 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.16  
12. Family ownership 24.78 17.04 0.00 -0.47 0.00 -0.01 -0.10 -0.34 0.09 -0.26 -0.10 -0.11 -0.03 
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TABLE 11 
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients – EPS forecasts for Taiwanese Firms (n =28,088)  
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. EPS estimates 3.36 13.17                
2. Ln (Size) 17.43 1.46 -0.03               
3. Ln (Age) 1.97 0.90 -0.06 0.36              
4. ROA 9.32 9.87 0.19 -0.18 -0.30             
5. R&D intensity 2.86 3.92 0.04 -0.04 -0.19 0.08            
6. Export ratio 51.40 36.49 0.10 -0.12 -0.17 0.32 0.26           
7. Debt/equity ratio 151.89 308.90 -0.06 0.47 0.09 -0.30 -0.23 -0.40          
8. Foreign ownership 16.66 14.24 0.06 0.22 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.21 -0.14         
9. Independent director 0.15 0.36 0.02 -0.06 -0.25 0.10 0.15 0.21 -0.11 0.20        
10. Business group affiliation 0.85 0.36 0.02 0.29 0.07 0.03 0.14 0.20 -0.07 0.13 0.02       
11. CEO US MBA 0.03 0.17 0.16 -0.08 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.17 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.20      
12. Number of forecasts 43.53 35.82 0.07 0.50 0.01 0.21 0.28 0.30 -0.08 0.44 0.06 0.31 -0.09     
13. Shareholder origin 0.36 0.48 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.06 -0.05 0.06 0.00 0.05    
14. Brokerage reputation 0.37 0.48 0.01 0.18 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.16 0.29   
15. Star analysts 0.03 0.17 -0.02 0.10 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.16  
16. Family ownership 22.43 17.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.22 -0.19 0.10 -0.21 -0.01 -0.05 0.08 -0.26 -0.01 0.01 0.03 
 
 
 
91 
 
 
TABLE 12 
Random-Effects Negative Binomial Regressions of Analyst Coverage for Taiwanese Firms, 1996 – 2005 a b 
 
 
 
Hypotheses H1a/b H2 H2 H2 H2 H5a H5a H6a H6a H7a H7a 
Variables 
All Analysts 
(M 1) 
SH  
 (M 2) 
ST  
(M 3) 
Non-local ST  
(M 4) 
Foreign  
(M 5) 
High Reputation   
(M 6) 
Low Reputation    
(M 7) 
SH  
 (M 8) 
ST  
 (M 9) 
SH  
 (M 10) 
ST  
 (M 11) 
Ln (Size) 0.76*** 0.88*** 0.80*** 0.85*** 0.81*** 0.93*** 0.77*** 0.87*** 0.79*** 1.01*** 0.97*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Ln (Age) 0.32*** 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.24*** 0.29*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
ROA 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01** 0.02*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
R&D intensity 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.01) (0.01) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.02) (0.01) 
Export ratio 0.004*** 0.002 0.004** 0.005** 0.004** 0.002 0.004** 0.002 0.004** 0.003 0.004* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Debt/equity ratio -0.0004** -0.0003*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.0004** -0.001* -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Foreign ownership 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.028*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Independent directorship 0.15* -0.04 0.16* 0.18 0.14 0.09 0.19* -0.05 0.14 0.11 0.34** 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.093) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.15) (0.11) (0.14) (0.10) 
Business group affiliation 0.10 0.18 0.16 0.23* 0.15 0.40** 0.05 0.18 0.16 -0.10 -0.01 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) (0.14) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
CEO’s US MBA           -0.10 0.30 
          (0.35) (0.31) 
Family ownership -0.01*** -0.01** -0.004 -0.003 -0.01*** -0.001 -0.01*** -0.01** -0.004 -0.01** -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Family ownership ×            
   Independent Director        0.001 0.001   
        (0.01) (0.004)   
   US MBA          0.002 -0.002 
          (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -13.6*** -16.1*** -13.7*** -14.9*** -14.9*** -16.9*** -13.4*** -16.1*** -13.6*** -14.5*** -15.2*** 
 (0.58) (0.69) (0.69) (0.76) (0.61) (0.89) (0.59) (0.69) (0.69) (0.80) (0.81) 
N 5148 5148 5148 5148 5148 5148 5148 5148 5148 3286 3286 
Log-likelihood -5742.2 -3478.9 -4481.2 -3566.0 -4994.8 -2893.5 -4942.0 -3478.9 -4481.2 -2271.9 -2875.4 
Wald χ2 (df) 2017 (38) 1869 (38) 1312 (38) 1231 (38) 2209 (38) 952 (38) 1907 (38) 1869 (39) 1313 (39) 1230 (39) 972 (39) 
a. SH - shareholder-based coverage; ST - stakeholder-based coverage; Non-local ST - stakeholder-based coverage with the exclusion of the coverage events by local brokerage houses; Foreign - 
coverage from foreign brokerage houses  
b. Standard errors are in parentheses. Industry and year dummies are included in all models. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, Two-tailed tests.  
92 
 
 
TABLE 13 
Random-Effects Negative Binomial Regressions of Analyst Coverage for Korean Firms, 1996 – 2005 a b 
 
Hypotheses H1a/b H2 H2 H2 H2 H5a H5a 
Variables 
All Analysts 
(M 1) 
SH  
(M 2) 
ST  
(M 3) 
Non-local ST  
 (M 4) 
Foreign  
(M 5) 
High Reputation  
 (M 6) 
Low Reputation  
 (M 7) 
Ln (Size) 0.75*** 0.86*** 0.80*** 0.92*** 0.82*** 0.96*** 0.79*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Ln (Age) 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.11* 0.01 0.16*** 0.04 0.18*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
ROA 0.002** 0.002** 0.002* 0.002** 0.002** 0.001 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Debt/equity ratio 0.00001* 0.00001* 0.00001* 0.00001* 0.00001* 0.00001 0.00001* 
 (0.000005) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.000005) (0.00001) (0.000005) 
Foreign ownership 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Business group affiliation 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.01 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) 
Family ownership -0.001 -0.006** 0.0003 -0.003 -0.004** -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Family ownership ×        
   Business Group        
        
Constant -14.6*** -18.1*** -14.8*** -18.1*** -17.3*** -18.8*** -14.7*** 
 (0.87) (0.98) (1.02) (1.14) (0.86) (1.27) (0.90) 
N 6947 6947 6947 6947 6947 6947 6947 
Log-likelihood -7198.1 -3788.4 -5658.0 -3383.4 -5223.6 -2877.1 -6552.9 
Wald χ2 (df) 2413.1 (69) 2040.9 (69) 2671.0 (69) 1443.6 (69) 2375.2 (69) 1180.4 (69) 2487.9 (69) 
a. SH - shareholder-based coverage; ST - stakeholder-based coverage; Non-local ST - stakeholder-based coverage with the exclusion of the coverage events 
by local brokerage houses; Foreign - coverage from foreign brokerage houses  
b. Standard errors are in parentheses. Industry and year dummies are included in all models. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, Two-tailed tests.  
 
 
93 
 
 
TABLE 14 
Ordered Logistic Regressions of Analyst Recommendations for Taiwanese Firms, 1996 – 2005 a b 
 
Hypotheses H3 H4 H4 H4 H4 H4 H4 H5b H5b H6b H7b 
Variables 
All Analysts  
(M 1) 
SH  
(M 2) 
ST  
(M 3) 
Non-local ST  
(M 4) 
Local ST  
(M 5) 
SH vs. ST 
(M 6) 
SH vs. Non-
local ST  
(M 7) 
Brokerage 
Reputation 
(M 8) 
Star Analysts 
(M 9) 
Indep. 
Director 
(M 10) 
CEO 
Education  
(M 11) 
Ln (Size) 0.05** 0.05 0.06* 0.07* 0.08* 0.05** 0.06** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.08** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Ln (Age) -0.16*** -0.19*** -0.15*** -0.17*** -0.14** -0.16*** -0.18*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.10** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
ROA 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
R&D intensity -0.01** -0.002 -0.02*** -0.01 -0.03*** -0.01** -0.004 -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 0.0001 
 (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.01) 
Export ratio -0.00003 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.003* -0.00003 0.001 -0.00003 -0.00004 -0.00002 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Debt/equity ratio -0.0004*** -0.0004** -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Foreign ownership 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01* 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Independent director -0.07 -0.02 -0.07 -0.10 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.10 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
Business group affiliation 0.04 0.11 -0.03 -0.09 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.03 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
# of Recommendations -0.004** -0.001 -0.01** -0.001 -0.01** -0.004** -0.001 -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.01*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Shareholder origin  -0.18***     -0.19*** -0.15* -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.18*** -0.21*** 
 (0.03)     (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Brokerage reputation  -0.42*** -0.17** -0.61*** -0.54***  -0.42*** -0.32*** -0.41*** -0.42*** -0.42*** -0.46*** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Star analyst  0.32*** 0.24* 0.44* 0.45*  0.32*** 0.31** 0.32*** 0.56*** 0.32*** 0.30** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.18) (0.19)  (0.10) (0.10) (0.109 (0.15) (0.10) (0.11) 
US MBA           0.20 
           (0.17) 
Family ownership -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.00001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Family ownership ×            
   Shareholder origin       0.0002 0.002     
      (0.002) (0.002)     
   Brokerage reputation        -0.0002    
        (0.002)    
   Star analyst         -0.01*   
         (0.004)   
   Independent Director          -0.001  
          (0.002)  
   US MBA           -0.002 
           (0.01) 
N 14164 5302 8862 4770 4092 14164 10072 14164 14164 14164 8681 
χ2 953.5 374.4 572.6 430.4 196.1 953.5 751.6 953.5 958.1 953.6 722.9 
a. SH - shareholder-based recommendations; ST - stakeholder-based recommendations; Non-local ST - stakeholder-based recommendations with the exclusion of the ratings by local brokerage 
houses; Foreign - recommendations from foreign brokerage houses  
b. Standard errors are in parentheses. Industry and year dummies are included in all models. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, Two-tailed tests. 
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TABLE 15 
Ordered Logistic Regressions of Analyst Recommendations for Korean Firms, 1996 – 2005 a b  
 
Hypotheses H3 H4 H4 H4 H4 H4 H4 H5b H5b 
Variables 
All Analysts 
(M 1) 
SH 
(M 2) 
ST 
(M 3) 
Non-local ST  
(M 4) 
Local ST  
(M 5) 
SH vs. ST 
(M 6) 
SH vs. Non-local ST  
(M 7) 
Brokerage Reputation 
(M 8) 
Star Analysts 
(M 9) 
Ln (Size) 0.15*** 0.02 0.16*** 0.02 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.02 0.15*** 0.10*** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Ln (Age) -0.05*** -0.12*** -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.03* 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
ROA 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Debt/equity ratio -0.00002* -0.00004* -0.00001 -0.00004* -0.000004 -0.00002* -0.00003** -0.00002* -0.00003*** 
 (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Foreign ownership 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.003** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Business group affiliation -0.12*** -0.08 -0.13*** -0.10 -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.08 -0.12*** -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
Number of Recommendations -0.01*** -0.01* -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Shareholder origin  0.25***     0.20*** 0.05 0.25*** 0.26*** 
 (0.04)     (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
Brokerage reputation -0.42*** -0.31*** -0.32*** -0.43***  -0.42*** -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.42*** 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Star analyst  -0.29*** -0.42** -0.19 -0.21 -0.49 -0.29*** -0.29** -0.29*** -0.16 
 (0.09) (0.15) (0.10) (0.11) (0.26) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) 
Family ownership 0.003*** -0.002 0.004*** 0.002 0.003** 0.003*** 0.0003 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Family ownership ×          
   Shareholder origin       0.002 -0.001   
      (0.002) (0.002)   
   Brokerage reputation        -0.002  
        (0.002)  
   Star analyst         -0.004 
         (0.01) 
N 29111 4753 24358 4354 20004 29111 9107 29111 29111 
χ2 3298.5 457.2 3469.1 484.7 3517.3 3300.3 839.9 3299.8 3134.9 
c. SH - shareholder-based recommendations; ST - stakeholder-based recommendations; Non-local ST - stakeholder-based recommendations with the exclusion of 
the ratings by local brokerage houses; Foreign - recommendations from foreign brokerage houses  
d. Standard errors are in parentheses. Industry and year dummies are included in all models. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, Two-tailed tests.  
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TABLE 16 
Results of OLS Regressions of Analyst Forecasts for Taiwanese Firms, 1996 – 2005 a b  
 
Hypotheses H3 H4 H4 H4 H4 H4 H4 H4 H5b H5b H5b 
Variables 
All Analysts  
(M 1) 
SH  
forecasts 
(M 2) 
ST  
forecasts 
(M 3) 
 Non-local  
ST forecasts  
 (M 4) 
Local  
forecasts  
(M 5) 
SH vs. ST 
(M 6) 
SH vs.  
Non-local ST  
(M 7) 
Brokerage  
Reputation 
(M 8) 
Star Analysts 
(M 9) 
Independent  
Directorship 
(M 10) 
CEO MBA  
Education 
(M 11) 
Ln (Size) -0.38*** -1.03*** 0.001 0.041 0.0086 -0.38*** -0.51*** -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.37*** -0.21 
 (0.10) (0.23) (0.09) (0.066) (0.17) (0.098) (0.12) (0.098) (0.098) (0.099) (0.15) 
Ln (Age) 0.24* 0.97*** -0.13 0.053 -0.16 0.24* 0.44** 0.24* 0.24* 0.22 0.74*** 
 (0.12) (0.28) (0.11) (0.084) (0.21) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.19) 
ROA 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.21*** 0.25*** 0.17*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.26*** 
 (0.01) (0.022) (0.01) (0.0061) (0.016) (0.0093) (0.011) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.015) 
R&D intensity 0.06* 0.26*** -0.06** -0.11*** 0.0097 0.056* 0.081** 0.056* 0.058* 0.055* 0.086* 
 (0.02) (0.053) (0.02) (0.015) (0.043) (0.023) (0.028) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.038) 
Export ratio 0.01*** 0.043*** -0.001 -0.0029 0.000078 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.028*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0083) (0.003) (0.0023) (0.0054) (0.0034) (0.0044) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0051) 
Debt/equity ratio 0.00085 0.0013 0.001 0.00028 0.00047 0.00082 0.00076 0.00085 0.00082 0.00082 0.00098 
 (0.00052) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.00041) (0.00084) (0.00052) (0.00066) (0.00052) (0.00052) (0.00052) (0.0012) 
Foreign ownership 0.010 0.066*** -0.02*** -0.051*** 0.0033 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.0096 0.052*** 
 (0.0069) (0.016) (0.01) (0.0047) (0.012) (0.0069) (0.0084) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.011) 
Independent director -0.98*** -1.53* -0.55* -0.56** -0.21 -0.98*** -1.21*** -0.98*** -0.97*** -0.64 0.31 
 (0.27) (0.66) (0.24) (0.17) (0.48) (0.27) (0.34) (0.27) (0.27) (0.38) (0.44) 
Business group affiliation 0.34 1.20* -0.27 -0.13 -0.27 0.34 0.68* 0.34 0.32 0.35 2.05*** 
 (0.25) (0.61) (0.21) (0.19) (0.36) (0.25) (0.34) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.38) 
Number of forecasts  0.013*** -0.0039 0.02*** 0.024*** 0.021** 0.013*** 0.0094* 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.011 
 (0.0037) (0.0088) (0.003) (0.0024) (0.0069) (0.0037) (0.0046) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0060) 
Shareholder origin  0.32     -0.044 0.057 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.34 
 (0.18)     (0.28) (0.31) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.27) 
Brokerage reputation -0.033 0.013 -0.07 0.073  -0.029 -0.037 -0.10 -0.029 -0.030 -0.16 
 (0.17) (0.38) (0.17) (0.11)  (0.17) (0.20) (0.27) (0.17) (0.17) (0.26) 
Star analyst  -1.29** -1.88* -0.15 -0.27  -1.24** -1.25** -1.29** -2.40*** -1.30** -1.35* 
 (0.47) (0.77) (0.63) (0.35)  (0.47) (0.49) (0.47) (0.67) (0.47) (0.68) 
US MBA           25.6*** 
           (1.25) 
Family ownership 0.01** 0.05*** -0.01 -0.01*** -0.003 0.01 0.016 0.013* 0.013* 0.017** 0.024** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.005) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.0085) (0.0063) (0.0053) (0.0056) (0.0081) 
Family ownership ×            
   Shareholder origin       0.02 0.014     
      (0.01) (0.011)     
   Brokerage reputation        0.0032    
        (0.0092)    
   Star analyst         0.046*   
         (0.020)   
   Independent Director          -0.016  
          (0.013)  
   US MBA           -0.19*** 
           (0.035) 
Constant 4.57** 7.78* 2.50 3.11** 1.22 4.66** 5.50** 4.60** 4.54** 4.36** -3.65 
 (1.58) (3.77) (1.41) (1.11) (2.70) (1.58) (2.04) (1.59) (1.58) (1.59) (2.35) 
N 28088 9986 18102 9327 8775 28088 19313 28088 28088 28088 18087 
adj. R2 0.046 0.045 0.073 0.261 0.031 0.046 0.054 0.046 0.047 0.046 0.078 
a. SH forecasts - shareholder-based; ST forecasts - stakeholder-based; Non-local ST - forecasts-based with the exclusion of forecasts by local brokerage houses; Foreign forecasts - forecasts from 
foreign brokerage houses  
b. Standard errors are in parentheses. Industry and year dummies are included in all models. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, Two-tailed tests 
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TABLE 17 
Results of OLS Regressions of Analyst Forecasts for Korean Firms, 1996 – 2005 a b 
 
Hypotheses H3 H4 H4 H4 H4 H4 H4 H5b H5b 
Variables 
All Analysts 
(M 1) 
SH  
forecasts 
(M 2) 
ST  
forecasts 
(M 3) 
 Non-local  
ST forecasts 
 (M 4) 
Local  
forecasts  
(M 5) 
SH vs. ST 
(M 6) 
SH vs. Non-local ST  
(M 7) 
Brokerage  
Reputation 
(M 8) 
Star Analysts 
(M 9) 
Ln (Size) 9302.1*** 5298.7 8780.0*** 1665.7 8016.7*** 9367.5*** 4469.7 9361.9*** 9305.3*** 
 (1213.0) (4852.3) (1256.4) (4172.0) (1342.2) (1214.0) (3175.9) (1213.7) (1213.1) 
Ln (Age) 10521.3*** 7050.2 10745.3*** 7033.8 11590.1*** 10453.5*** 7182.9* 10480.7*** 10512.6*** 
 (1340.3) (5236.4) (1377.4) (3913.5) (1481.4) (1341.3) (3197.8) (1340.6) (1340.8) 
ROA 5082.1*** 7271.8*** 4865.1*** 5467.2*** 4814.0*** 5076.2*** 6444.7*** 5074.4*** 5081.5*** 
 (144.9) (590.7) (148.0) (485.7) (156.0) (144.9) (379.3) (145.0) (144.9) 
Debt/equity ratio 7.87*** 5.09* 8.30*** 9.18*** 8.37*** 7.86*** 6.24*** 7.86*** 7.87*** 
 (0.54) (2.04) (0.56) (2.65) (0.57) (0.54) (1.55) (0.54) (0.54) 
Foreign ownership 276.6*** -45.7 284.7*** 296.9 253.1** 279.1*** 126.6 278.0*** 276.5*** 
 (71.2) (318.0) (72.3) (213.6) (77.3) (71.3) (183.3) (71.2) (71.2) 
Business group affiliation -4688.4 -46281.5*** -2259.0 -23330.9* 124.7 -4788.3 -32047.6*** -4754.5 -4700.5 
 (2987.1) (13506.7) (3022.6) (10071.7) (3174.9) (2988.1) (8235.1) (2987.5) (2987.6) 
Number of forecasts  -343.5*** -434.1*** -325.2*** -397.4*** -305.9*** -343.6*** -424.7*** -343.3*** -343.5*** 
 (20.3) (90.6) (20.6) (65.0) (22.1) (20.3) (53.8) (20.3) (20.3) 
Shareholder origin  4697.5     10117.9 -3259.3 4782.4 4717.7 
 (4017.8)     (5777.5) (7967.4) (4018.2) (4018.7) 
Brokerage reputation -8746.9* -15979.8 -3390.8 -14059.8*  -8692.5* -12724.1* -3254.2 -8784.9* 
 (3753.5) (8775.9) (4445.7) (6330.5)  (3753.7) (5110.9) (5416.1) (3756.8) 
Star analyst  -7847.3 -11161.6 -4714.0 -23458.1 10923.2 -7885.5 -33691.8* -8434.4 -4975.6 
 (10410.7) (32177.8) (11169.4) (13954.2) (22616.5) (10410.7) (13532.9) (10419.0) (15871.6) 
Family ownership -525.2*** -1513.0*** -457.5*** -784.9** -439.3*** -502.3*** -1012.4*** -499.1*** -524.3*** 
 (76.9) (364.2) (77.7) (260.5) (81.8) (78.9) (259.0) (79.1) (77.0) 
Family ownership ×          
   Shareholder origin       -276.1 -217.4   
      (211.5) (311.9)   
   Brokerage reputation        -279.6  
        (198.8)  
   Star analyst         -149.3 
         (623.0) 
Constant -293168.9*** -220448.4 -279965.5*** -143573.6 -263559.6*** -294924.5*** -202382.0** -294703.5*** -293205.2*** 
 (27788.8) (113192.4) (28680.3) (110549.7) (30321.1) (27821.2) (77191.5) (27810.0) (27789.5) 
N 58399 5382 53017 6344 46673 58399 11726 58399 58399 
adj. R2 0.043 0.085 0.040 0.061 0.039 0.043 0.069 0.043 0.043 
a. SH forecasts - shareholder-based; ST forecasts - stakeholder-based; Non-local ST - forecasts-based with the exclusion of forecasts by local brokerage houses; Foreign 
forecasts - forecasts from foreign brokerage houses  
b. Standard errors are in parentheses. Industry and year dummies are included in all models. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, Two-tailed tests 
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TABLE 18 
Results of the Interaction of Business Groups and Family Ownership on Analysts’ Coverage and Ratings, 1996 – 2005 a b 
  
Hypotheses H8a H8a H8a H8a H8b H8b H8b H8b H8b H8b H8b H8b 
Countries Taiwan Taiwan Korea Korea Taiwan Taiwan Korea Korea Taiwan Taiwan Korea Korea 
Variables 
SH coverage 
(M 1) 
ST coverage 
(M 2) 
 SH 
coverage 
 (M 3) 
ST 
Coverage 
(M 4) 
SH rating1  
(M 5) 
ST rating1  
(M 6) 
SH rating1 
(M 7) 
ST rating1 
(M 8) 
SH rating2  
(M 9) 
ST rating2  
(M 10) 
SH rating2 
(M 11) 
ST rating2 
(M 12) 
Ln (Size) 0.86*** 0.79*** 0.88*** 0.80*** 0.04 0.06* 0.02 0.16*** -0.99*** 0.09 4003.4 8222.4*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.22) (0.10) (4872.3) (1262.5) 
Ln (Age) 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.17*** 0.11* -0.17*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.04* 1.14*** -0.15 7987.6 11227*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.038) (0.032) (0.04) (0.02) (0.27) (0.12) (5244.3) (1381.4) 
ROA 0.01** 0.02*** 0.002** 0.002* 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.27*** 0.22*** 7222.5*** 4864.1*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.02) (0.01) (590.6) (147.9) 
Debt/equity ratio -0.0003*** -0.001*** 0.00001* 0.00001* -0.0004** -0.0002 -0.00004* -0.00001 0.001 0.0004 5.07* 8.26*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.001) (0.001) (2.04) (0.56) 
Foreign ownership 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.06*** -0.02*** -65.3 279.7*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.02) (0.01) (317.9) (72.3) 
Business group affiliation -0.04 -0.05 0.15 -0.04 0.24 0.10 -0.07 0.08 1.42 0.70 -90157*** -19977*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.11) (0.08) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12) (0.06) (0.93) (0.39) (20942.5) (5009.8) 
Number of forecasts      -0.001 -0.01*** -0.01* -0.01*** -0.001 0.02*** -407.8*** -309.9*** 
     (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.01) (0.004) (91.0) (20.9) 
Brokerage reputation     -0.17** -0.60*** -0.31*** -0.32*** 0.02 -0.12 -15124.8 -3138.8 
     (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.37) (0.19) (8776.1) (4445.3) 
Star analyst      0.26* 0.43* -0.42** -0.19 -1.62* -0.23 -6564.1 -4256.6 
     (0.11) (0.18) (0.15) (0.10) (0.75) (0.73) (32201.9) (11167.9) 
Family ownership -0.02*** -0.01* -0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.01*** 0.05 0.03* -2299.9*** -701.8*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.03) (0.01) (463.6) (95.3) 
Family ownership ×             
   Business group  0.01 0.01 -0.01* 0.002 -0.01 -0.01 -0.0002 -0.01*** -0.005 -0.03* 1882.5** 635.5*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.03) (0.01) (687.0) (143.3) 
Constant -15.7*** -13.0*** -18.3*** -14.7***     9.32* -0.14 -196067.4 -270149*** 
 (0.69) (0.69) (0.99) (1.03)     (3.68) (1.62) (113472.6) (28760.6) 
N 5274 5274 6947 6947 5450 9121 4753 24358 10245 18593 5382 53017 
Log-likelihood -3575.2 -4582.4 -3785.8 -5657.6 -8000.8 -12935.1 -6617.2 -32523.5     
Wald χ2 (df) 1845 (36) 1271 (36) 2050 (70) 2672 (70) 394 (39) 571 (39) 457 (65) 3491 (71)     
adj. R2         0.039 0.069 0.086 0.041 
a. SH - shareholder-based; ST - stakeholder-based; Rating1 – analysts’ recommendations; Rating2 – analysts’ forecasts  
b. Standard errors are in parentheses. Industry and year dummies are included in all models. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, Two-tailed tests 
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TABLE 19 
Summary of Empirical Results 
  
 
Analysts’ Coverage Analysts’ Recommendations Analysts’ forecasts 
Taiwan Korea Taiwan Korea Taiwan Korea 
A firm’s family 
ownership  
Professional logic Support for H1b 
Partial support for 
H1b 
Partial support for 
H3 
No support for H3 No support for H3 Support for H3 
National corporate 
governance logic 
Support for H2 Support for H2 No support for H4 No support for H4 No support for H4 No support for H4 
The moderating role of reputation Support for H5a No support for H5a No support for H5b No support for H5b Support for H5b No support for H5b 
The moderating role of legitimacy 
signaling 
No support for H6a 
and H7a 
Data is not available 
No support for H6b 
and H7b 
Data is not available 
No support for H6b 
and H7b 
Data is not available 
Differences of business group 
structures between KOR and TAI 
Support for H8a No support for H8b No support for H8b 
 
